




## Rich's lesson module checklist

- Slides and lab posted
- WB converted from PowerPoint
- Print out agenda slide and annotate page numbers
  
- Flash cards
- Properties
- Page numbers
- 1<sup>st</sup> minute quiz
- Web Calendar summary
- Web book pages
- Commands
  
- Practice test on Canvas
  
- Backup slides, whiteboard slides, CCC info, handouts on flash drive
- Spare 9v battery for mic
- Key card for classroom door

*Last updated 10/25/2016*



### **Student Learner Outcomes**

1. Defend a computer and a LAN against a variety of different types of security attacks using a number of hands-on techniques.
2. Defend a computer and a LAN against a variety of different types of security attacks using a number of hands-on techniques.

## Introductions and Credits



Rich Simms

- HP Alumnus.
- Started teaching in 2008 when Jim Griffin went on sabbatical.
- Rich's site: <http://simms-teach.com>

And thanks to:

- Steven Bolt at for his WASTC EH training.
- Kevin Vaccaro for his CSSIA EH training and Netlab+ pods.
- EC-Council for their online self-paced CEH v9 course.
- Sam Bowne for his WASTC seminars, textbook recommendation and fantastic EH website (<https://samsclass.info/>).
- Lisa Bock for her great lynda.com EH course.
- John Govsky for many teaching best practices: e.g. the First Minute quizzes, the online forum, and the point grading system (<http://teacherjohn.com/>).
- Google for everything else!



## Student checklist for attending class

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL [simms-teach.com/cis90calendar.php](http://simms-teach.com/cis90calendar.php). The page title is "Rich's Cabrillo College CIS Classes CIS 90 Calendar". The main content area is titled "CIS 90 (Fall 2014) Calendar" and includes a "Calendar" link. A table lists lessons, with Lesson 9/2 highlighted. The details for Lesson 9/2 include:

Lesson	Date	Topics	Link
CIS 76	9/2	<p><b>Class and Litera Overview</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Understand how the course will work</li> <li>High-level overview of computers, operating systems and virtual machines</li> <li>Overview of UNIX/Linux market and architecture</li> <li>Using SSH for remote network logs</li> <li>Using terminals and the command line</li> </ul> <p><b>Materials</b></p> <p><a href="#">Presentation slides (download)</a></p> <p><b>Supplemental</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PowerPoint: Logging into Opus (download)</li> </ul> <p><b>Assignments</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Student Survey</li> <li>Lab 1</li> </ul> <p><b>CIS 90 Calendar</b></p> <p><a href="#">Enter virtual classroom</a></p>	<p>2.4</p> <p>9/23</p> <p>9/24</p> <p>(high)</p>

1. Browse to:  
**<http://simms-teach.com>**
2. Click the **CIS 76** link.
3. Click the **Calendar** link.
4. Locate today's lesson.
5. Find the **Presentation slides** for the lesson and **download** for easier viewing.
6. Click the **Enter virtual classroom** link to join CCC Confer.
7. Log into Opus with Putty or ssh command.

Note: Blackboard Collaborate Launcher only needs to be installed once. It has already been downloaded and installed on the classroom PC's.





## Student checklist for suggested screen layout

Google

CCC Confer

Downloaded PDF of Lesson Slides

The screenshot shows a virtual classroom interface. On the left is a sidebar with navigation options like 'Login', 'Flashcards', 'Admin', and 'CIS 90 (Spring)'. The main area is divided into several windows: a 'Rich's Cabrillo College CIS 90 Calendar' window, a 'CCC Confer RICH SIMMS VIRTUAL CLASSROOM' window showing a video feed of 'Rich Simms' and a list of participants, a 'Google Maps' window titled 'Cabrillo College, San Jose, CA', and an 'Adobe Acrobat Pro' window displaying 'The CIS 90 System Playground' slide. A terminal window at the bottom right shows a password prompt and a welcome message for 'Opus'.


CIS 76 website Calendar page

One or more login sessions to Opus




# Student checklist for sharing desktop with classmates


1) Instructor gives you sharing privileges.




2) Click overlapping rectangles icon. If white "Start Sharing" text is present then click it as well.



3) Click OK button.




4) Select "Share desktop" and click Share button.



# Rich's CCC Confer checklist - setup





[ ] Preload White Board




[ ] Connect session to Teleconference

*Session now connected to teleconference*




[ ] Is recording on?



*Red dot means recording*

[ ] Use teleconferencing, not mic

*Should be grayed out*



*Should change from phone handset icon to little Microphone icon and the Teleconferencing... message displayed*



## Rich's CCC Confer checklist - screen layout



The screenshot displays a Windows desktop with several applications open. On the left is the CCC Confer interface, showing a video feed of Rich Simms and a list of participants. In the center is a terminal window (Putty) showing a login session for 'simben90@oslab'. To the right is a Chrome browser window displaying a PDF document with quiz questions. Below the terminal is the vSphere Client interface, showing a virtual machine named 'CIS 192'. Red callout boxes with white text identify the following applications: 'foxit for slides' (pointing to the PDF viewer), 'chrome' (pointing to the browser), 'putty' (pointing to the terminal), and 'vSphere Client' (pointing to the vSphere interface).


[ ] layout and share apps









# Rich's CCC Confer checklist - webcam setup



- [ ] Video (webcam)
- [ ] Make Video Follow Moderator Focus



# Rich's CCC Confer checklist - Elmo




The "rotate image" button is necessary if you use both the side table and the white board.

Quite interesting that they consider you to be an "expert" in order to use this button!

Elmo rotated down to view side table



Elmo rotated up to view white board



Run and share the Image Mate program just as you would any other app with CCC Confer

## Rich's CCC Confer checklist - universal fixes


Universal Fix for CCC Confer:

- 1) Shrink (500 MB) and delete Java cache
- 2) Uninstall and reinstall latest Java runtime
- 3) <http://www.cccconfer.org/support/technicalSupport.aspx>


Control Panel (small icons)




General Tab > Settings...



500MB cache size



Delete these



Google Java download





# Start



# Sound Check

*Students that dial-in should mute their line using \*6 to prevent unintended noises distracting the web conference.*

*Instructor can use \*96 to mute all student lines.*



Instructor: **Rich Simms**

Dial-in: **888-886-3951**

Passcode: **136690**




Ryan



Jordan




Takashi




Karl-Heinz



Sean



Benji




Joshua



Brian



Tess




Jeremy



David H.



Roberto



Nelli



Mike C.



Deryck




Alex



Michael W.




Carter



Thomas



Wes



Jennifer



Marcos



Tim



Luis



Dave R.

## First Minute Quiz

Please answer these questions **in the order** shown:

Use CCC Confer White Board

**email answers to: [risimms@cabrillo.edu](mailto:risimms@cabrillo.edu)**

**(answers must be emailed within the first few minutes of class for credit)**



## Review and Gaps

### Objectives

- Look at the Mirai Bot
- Get second group attempt on EC-Council mini assessment
- Review material from the NISGTC EH course

### Agenda

- Quiz #7
- Questions
- In the news
- Best practices
- Mirai Botnet
- EC-Council mini assessment 1-10
- Housekeeping
- EC-Council mini assessment 11-20
- Red/blue pods
- EC-Council mini assessment 21-30
- NISGTC - Domain 3
- Steganography
- EC-Council mini assessment 31-40
- NISGTC - Domain 4
- More recon websites
- EC-Council mini assessment 41-50
- NISGTC - Domain 10
- Assignment
- Wrap up



# Admonition



## **Unauthorized hacking is a crime.**

**The hacking methods and activities learned in this course can result in prison terms, large fines and lawsuits if used in an unethical manner. They may only be used in a lawful manner on equipment you own or where you have explicit permission from the owner.**

**Students that engage in any unethical, unauthorized or illegal hacking may be dropped from the course and will receive no legal protection or help from the instructor or the college.**



# Questions

# Questions

How this course works?

Past lesson material?

Previous labs?

Chinese  
Proverb

他問一個問題，五分鐘是個傻子，他不問一個問題仍然是一個傻瓜永遠。

*He who asks a question is a fool for five minutes; he who does not ask a question remains a fool forever.*






# In the news

## Recent news

1. This Is Why Half the Internet Shut Down Today

<http://gizmodo.com/this-is-probably-why-half-the-internet-shut-down-today-1788062835>

Thanks Deryck



2. American hacker Jester warns Russia to stop interfering with U.S. election

<http://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/jester-hacks-russian-ministry/>



## Recent news

3. Linux exploit 'Dirty COW' allows any user to gain root access in mere five seconds

<https://thetechportal.com/2016/10/24/linux-vulnerability-serious-hack-easy/>



<https://youtu.be/kEsshExn7aE>



# Best Practices

## Defense Best Practices

### Who Makes the IoT Things Under Attack?

<https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/who-makes-the-iot-things-under-attack/>

*"If possible, **reset the device to the factory-default settings**. This should ensure that if any malware has been uploaded to the device that it will be wiped permanently. Most devices have a small, recessed button that needs to be pressed and held down for a several seconds while powered on to reset the thing back to the factory default settings.*

*When the device comes back online, quickly fire up a Web browser, navigate to the administration panel, enter the default credentials, and then **change the default password** to something stronger and more memorable. I hope it goes without saying that any passwords remotely resembling the default passwords noted in the image above are horrible passwords. [Here's some advice](#) on picking better ones."*






# Mirai Bot

# DDoS attack on Dyn

Friday October 21, 2016



*A depiction of the outages caused by today's attacks on Dyn, an Internet infrastructure company. Source: Downtetector.com.*

*"The attack began creating problems for Internet users reaching an array of sites, including Twitter, Amazon, Tumblr, Reddit, Spotify and Netflix."*

<https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/hacked-cameras-dvrs-powered-todays-massive-internet-outage/>

## DDoS attack on Dyn

Friday October 21, 2016

*Drew says the attack consisted mainly of TCP SYN floods aimed directly at against port 53 of Dyn's DNS servers, but also a prepend attack, which is also called a subdomain attack. That's when attackers send DNS requests to a server for a domain for which they know the target is authoritative. But they tack onto the front of the domain name random prepends or subnet designations. The server won't have these in its cache so will have to look them up, sapping computational resources and effectively preventing the server from handling legitimate traffic, he says.*

<http://www.networkworld.com/article/3134057/security/how-the-dyn-ddos-attack-unfolded.html>

## DDoS attack on Dyn

Friday October 21, 2016

*In an interim report on the attack, Dyn said: “We can confirm, with the help of analysis from **Flashpoint** and **Akamai**, that one source of the traffic for the attacks were devices infected by the **Mirai botnet**. We observed 10s of millions of discrete IP addresses associated with the Mirai botnet that were part of the attack.”*

<https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/iot-device-maker-vows-product-recall-legal-action-against-western-accusers/>

## Multiple Mirai botnets now

“While Flashpoint has confirmed that Mirai botnets were used in the October 21, 2016 attack against Dyn, they were separate and distinct botnets from those used to execute the DDoS attacks against ‘Krebs on Security’ and OVH,” Flashpoint said in a statement sent to Salted Hash.

Since the Mirai source code was released earlier this month, copycats have used it to create botnets of their own in order to launch DDoS attacks. Today’s attacks are proof that script kiddies and criminals wasted no time in recycling the Mirai code for their own use.

<http://www.csoonline.com/article/3133992/security/ddos-knocks-down-dns-datacenters-across-the-u-s-affected.html>



# Mirai Source Code

# Mirai bot source code has been released

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL <https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/source-code-for-iot-botnet-mirai-released/>. The page features several advertisements at the top, including one for Exabeam and another for KrebsOnSecurity. The main article is titled "01 Source Code for IoT Botnet 'Mirai' Released" and is dated OCT 16. The article text states: "The source code that powers the 'Internet of Things' (IoT) botnet responsible for launching the historically large distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack against KrebsOnSecurity last month has been publicly released, virtually guaranteeing that the Internet will soon be flooded with attacks from many new botnets powered by insecure routers, IP cameras, digital video recorders and other easily hackable devices." It also mentions that the leak was announced on Friday in the Hackforums community and that the malware, dubbed "Mirai," spreads to vulnerable devices by scanning the Internet for IoT systems.

<https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/source-code-for-iot-botnet-mirai-released/>

The screenshot shows a GitHub comment from user 'tony' on October 3, 2016, at 10:43 pm. The comment contains the following text: <https://github.com/jgamblin/Mirai-Source-Code/blob/6a5941be681b839e8ff8ece1de8b245bcd5ffbo2/mirai/bot/scanner.c#L123>. There is a 'REPLY' button below the comment.


<https://github.com/jgamblin/Mirai-Source-Code>

*The source code is available now on EH-Rouji*

## Activity

Log into eh-rouji and change into the mirai-botnet directory

```
ssh cis76@eh-rouji
cd mirai-botnet
```




```

cis76@rouji:~/mirai-botnet
[rsimms@oslab ~]$ ssh cis76@eh-rouji
cis76@eh-rouji's password:
Last login: Mon Oct 24 09:41:34 2016 from opus.cis.cabrillo.edu
[cis76@rouji ~]$ ls
captured-bot  Desktop  mirai-botnet
[cis76@rouji ~]$ cd mirai-botnet/
[cis76@rouji mirai-botnet]$ ls
decode  mirai-bot-notes  Mirai-Source-Code-master  README
[cis76@rouji mirai-botnet]$

```

tty



```

cis76@rouji:~/mirai-botnet
[cis76@rouji mirai-botnet]$ tty
/dev/pts/2
[cis76@rouji mirai-botnet]$

```

*Use tty and put your terminal device /dev/pts/xx into the chat window*

# Mirai Default Credentials

## Default Credentials

*"The purpose of these scans is to locate under-secured IoT devices that could be remotely accessed via easily guessable login credentials—usually factory default usernames and passwords (e.g., admin/admin)."*

[https://www.incapsula.com/blog/malware-analysis-mirai-ddos-botnet.html?utm\\_source=twitter&utm\\_medium=organic\\_emp&utm\\_campaign=2016\\_Q4\\_miraiddos](https://www.incapsula.com/blog/malware-analysis-mirai-ddos-botnet.html?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=organic_emp&utm_campaign=2016_Q4_miraiddos)



## Activity

Change into the bot source code directory and view scanner.c

```
cd mirai-botnet/Mirai-Source-Code-master/mirai/bot/  
vi scanner.c
```

```
cis76@rouji:~/mirai-botnet/Mirai-Source-Code-master/mirai/bot
tcph->source = source_port;
tcph->doff = 0;
tcph->>window = rand_next() & 0xFFFF;
tcph->syn = TRUE;

// Set up passwords
add_auth_entry("\x50\x4D\x4D\x56", "\x5A\x41\x11\x17\x13\x13", 10); // root xc3511
add_auth_entry("\x50\x4D\x4D\x56", "\x54\x4B\x58\x5A\x54", 9); // root vizxv
add_auth_entry("\x50\x4D\x4D\x56", "\x43\x46\x4F\x4B\x4C", 8); // root admin
add_auth_entry("\x43\x46\x4F\x4B\x4C", "\x43\x46\x4F\x4B\x4C", 7); // admin admin
add_auth_entry("\x50\x4D\x4D\x56", "\x1A\x1A\x1A\x1A\x1A\x1A", 6); // root 888888
add_auth_entry("\x50\x4D\x4D\x56", "\x5A\x4F\x4A\x46\x4B\x52\x41", 5); // root xmhdipc
add_auth_entry("\x50\x4D\x4D\x56", "\x46\x47\x44\x43\x57\x4E\x56", 5); // root default
add_auth_entry("\x50\x4D\x4D\x56", "\x48\x57\x43\x4C\x56\x47\x41\x4A", 5); // root juantech
add_auth_entry("\x50\x4D\x4D\x56", "\x13\x10\x11\x16\x17\x14", 5); // root 123456

118,1 11%
```

*Scroll down to the scanner\_init function and find where credentials are being setup. Look for the username "support" and put the corresponding password into the chat window.*

# Mirai Target IoT Devices

# Mirai Target Devices

Username/Password	Manufacturer	Link to supporting evidence
admin/123456	ACTi IP Camera	<a href="https://ipvm.com/reports/ip-cameras-default-passwords-directory">https://ipvm.com/reports/ip-cameras-default-passwords-directory</a>
root/anko	ANKO Products DVR	<a href="http://www.cctvforum.com/viewtopic.php?f=3&amp;t=44250">http://www.cctvforum.com/viewtopic.php?f=3&amp;t=44250</a>
root/pass	Axis IP Camera, et. al	<a href="http://www.cleancss.com/router-default/Axis/0543-001">http://www.cleancss.com/router-default/Axis/0543-001</a>
root/vizxv	Dahua Camera	<a href="http://www.cam-it.org/index.php?topic=5192.0">http://www.cam-it.org/index.php?topic=5192.0</a>
root/888888	Dahua DVR	<a href="http://www.cam-it.org/index.php?topic=5035.0">http://www.cam-it.org/index.php?topic=5035.0</a>
root/666666	Dahua DVR	<a href="http://www.cam-it.org/index.php?topic=5035.0">http://www.cam-it.org/index.php?topic=5035.0</a>
root/7ujMko0vizxv	Dahua IP Camera	<a href="http://www.cam-it.org/index.php?topic=9396.0">http://www.cam-it.org/index.php?topic=9396.0</a>
root/7ujMko0admin	Dahua IP Camera	<a href="http://www.cam-it.org/index.php?topic=9396.0">http://www.cam-it.org/index.php?topic=9396.0</a>
666666/666666	Dahua IP Camera	<a href="http://www.cleancss.com/router-default/Dahua/DH-IPC-HDW4300C">http://www.cleancss.com/router-default/Dahua/DH-IPC-HDW4300C</a>
root/dreambox	Dreambox TV receiver	<a href="https://www.satellites.co.uk/forums/threads/reset-root-password-plugin.101146/">https://www.satellites.co.uk/forums/threads/reset-root-password-plugin.101146/</a>
root/zlxx	EV ZLX Two-way Speaker?	?
root/juantech	Guangzhou Juan Optical	<a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11114012">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11114012</a>
root/xc3511	H.264 - Chinese DVR	<a href="http://www.cctvforum.com/viewtopic.php?f=56&amp;t=34930&amp;start=15">http://www.cctvforum.com/viewtopic.php?f=56&amp;t=34930&amp;start=15</a>
root/hi3518	HiSilicon IP Camera	<a href="https://acassis.wordpress.com/2014/08/10/i-got-a-new-hi3518-ip-camera-modules/">https://acassis.wordpress.com/2014/08/10/i-got-a-new-hi3518-ip-camera-modules/</a>
root/klv123	HiSilicon IP Camera	<a href="https://gist.github.com/gabonator/74cdd6ab4f733ff047356198c781f27d">https://gist.github.com/gabonator/74cdd6ab4f733ff047356198c781f27d</a>
root/klv1234	HiSilicon IP Camera	<a href="https://gist.github.com/gabonator/74cdd6ab4f733ff047356198c781f27d">https://gist.github.com/gabonator/74cdd6ab4f733ff047356198c781f27d</a>
root/jvzbd	HiSilicon IP Camera	<a href="https://gist.github.com/gabonator/74cdd6ab4f733ff047356198c781f27d">https://gist.github.com/gabonator/74cdd6ab4f733ff047356198c781f27d</a>
root/admin	IPX-DDK Network Camera	<a href="http://www.ipxinc.com/products/cameras-and-video-servers/network-cameras/">http://www.ipxinc.com/products/cameras-and-video-servers/network-cameras/</a>
root/system	IQinVision Cameras, et. al	<a href="https://ipvm.com/reports/ip-cameras-default-passwords-directory">https://ipvm.com/reports/ip-cameras-default-passwords-directory</a>
admin/meinsm	Mobotix Network Camera	<a href="http://www.forum.use-ip.co.uk/threads/mobotix-default-password.76/">http://www.forum.use-ip.co.uk/threads/mobotix-default-password.76/</a>
root/54321	Packet8 VOIP Phone, et. al	<a href="http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:W1phozQZURUJ:community.freepbx.org/t/packet8-atas-phones/4111">http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:W1phozQZURUJ:community.freepbx.org/t/packet8-atas-phones/4111</a>
root/00000000	Panasonic Printer	<a href="https://www.experts-exchange.com/questions/26194395/Default-User-Password-for-Panasonic-DP-C405-Web-Interface.html">https://www.experts-exchange.com/questions/26194395/Default-User-Password-for-Panasonic-DP-C405-Web-Interface.html</a>
root/realtek	RealTek Routers	
admin/1111111	Samsung IP Camera	<a href="https://ipvm.com/reports/ip-cameras-default-passwords-directory">https://ipvm.com/reports/ip-cameras-default-passwords-directory</a>
root/xmhdipc	Shenzhen Anran Security Camera	<a href="https://www.amazon.com/MegaPixel-Wireless-Network-Surveillance-Camera/product-reviews/B00EB6FNDI">https://www.amazon.com/MegaPixel-Wireless-Network-Surveillance-Camera/product-reviews/B00EB6FNDI</a>
admin/smcadmin	SMC Routers	<a href="http://www.cleancss.com/router-default/SMC/ROUTER">http://www.cleancss.com/router-default/SMC/ROUTER</a>
root/ikwb	Toshiba Network Camera	<a href="http://faq.surveillixdvrssupport.com/index.php?action=artikel&amp;cat=4&amp;id=8&amp;artlang=en">http://faq.surveillixdvrssupport.com/index.php?action=artikel&amp;cat=4&amp;id=8&amp;artlang=en</a>
ubnt/ubnt	Ubiquiti AirOS Router	<a href="http://setuprouter.com/router/ubiquiti/airos-airgrid-m5hp/login.htm">http://setuprouter.com/router/ubiquiti/airos-airgrid-m5hp/login.htm</a>
supervisor/supervisor	VideoIQ	<a href="https://ipvm.com/reports/ip-cameras-default-passwords-directory">https://ipvm.com/reports/ip-cameras-default-passwords-directory</a>
root/<none>	Vivotek IP Camera	<a href="https://ipvm.com/reports/ip-cameras-default-passwords-directory">https://ipvm.com/reports/ip-cameras-default-passwords-directory</a>
admin/1111	Xerox printers, et. al	<a href="https://atyourservice.blogs.xerox.com/2012/08/28/logging-in-as-system-administrator-on-your-xerox-printer/">https://atyourservice.blogs.xerox.com/2012/08/28/logging-in-as-system-administrator-on-your-xerox-printer/</a>
root/Zte521	ZTE Router	<a href="http://www.ironbugs.com/2016/02/hack-and-patch-your-zte-f660-routers.html">http://www.ironbugs.com/2016/02/hack-and-patch-your-zte-f660-routers.html</a>

# Mirai Target Devices

The screenshot shows a web browser window displaying the IPVM website. The address bar shows the URL: <https://ipvm.com/reports/ip-cameras-default-passwords-directory>. The page features a navigation menu with links for About, Articles, Members, Tests, Courses, Calculator, Tools, and Discussions, along with a Login button and a search field. A prominent banner advertises a 'Free 2016 IP Networking Book' with a 'GET THE FREE BOOK NOW' button. The main content area is titled 'IP Cameras Default Passwords Directory' and includes an author credit to Ethan Ace, published on May 28, 2016. The text discusses the difficulty of finding default passwords for IP cameras and provides a list of manufacturers and their default credentials. A 'MEMBER LOGIN' section is visible on the right side of the page.

**IPVM** About Articles Members Tests Courses Calculator Tools Discussions Login Search

**Free 2016 IP Networking Book** GET THE FREE BOOK NOW

## IP Cameras Default Passwords Directory

Author: Ethan Ace, Published on May 28, 2016

Finding an IP camera's default password can be tedious or aggravating. And keeping up with changes in newer firmwares can be difficult, especially for occasional users.

With that in mind, we have gathered this list of IP camera manufacturers and their default usernames and passwords to help users get started more quickly. After the list, we discuss recent changes by manufacturers as well as password security issues.

[Don't miss [downloading our free IP video surveillance book.](#)]

**Manufacturer List**

For each manufacturer, we list the username first and password section in the following format: username/password. Where manufacturers have multiple defaults, or differences in newer/older firmwares, we have noted it:

- ACTI: admin/123456 or Admin/123456
- American Dynamics: admin/admin or admin/9999
- Arecont Vision: none
- Avigilon: Previously admin/admin, changed to Administrator/<blank> in later firmware versions
- Axis: Traditionally root/pass, new Axis cameras require password creation during first login (though root/pass may be used for ONVIF access)
- Basler: admin/admin

**MEMBER LOGIN**

Login

Password

Login

Remember me

# Mirai Target Devices






## 24 IoT Device Maker Vows Product Recall, Legal Action Against Western Accusers

OCT 16

A Chinese electronics firm pegged by experts as responsible for making many of the components leveraged in **last week's massive attack** that disrupted Twitter and dozens of popular Web sites has vowed to recall some of its vulnerable products, even as it threatened legal action against this publication and others for allegedly tarnishing the company's brand.



Last week's attack on online infrastructure provider **Dyn** was launched at least in part by **Mirai**, a **now open-source** malware strain that scans the Internet for routers, cameras, digital video recorders and other Internet of Things "IoT" devices protected only by the factory-default passwords. Once infected with Mirai, the IoT systems can be used to flood a target with so much junk Web traffic that the target site can no longer accommodate legitimate users or visitors.

<https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/iot-device-maker-vows-product-recall-legal-action-against-western-accusers/>

# Mirai IP Address Targets

## Mirai avoids attacking specific networks

*"One of the most interesting things revealed by the code was a hardcoded list of IPs Mirai bots are programmed to avoid when performing their IP scans."*

[https://www.incapsula.com/blog/malware-analysis-mirai-ddos-botnet.html?utm\\_source=twitter&utm\\_medium=organic\\_emp&utm\\_campaign=2016\\_Q4\\_miraidos](https://www.incapsula.com/blog/malware-analysis-mirai-ddos-botnet.html?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=organic_emp&utm_campaign=2016_Q4_miraidos)

## Activity

Locate the `get_random_ip` function in `scanner.c`

```
cd mirai-botnet/Mirai-Source-Code-master/mirai/bot/
vi scanner.c
```

```
cis76@rouji:~/mirai-botnet/Mirai-Source-Code-master/mirai/bot
static ipv4_t get_random_ip(void)
{
    uint32_t tmp;
    uint8_t o1, o2, o3, o4;

    do
    {
        tmp = rand_next();

        o1 = tmp & 0xFF;
        o2 = (tmp >> 8) & 0xFF;
        o3 = (tmp >> 16) & 0xFF;
        o4 = (tmp >> 24) & 0xFF;
    }
    while (o1 == 127 || // 127.0.0.0/8 - Loopback
           (o1 == 0) || // 0.0.0.0/8 - Invalid address space
           (o1 == 3) || // 3.0.0.0/8 - General Electric Company
           (o1 == 15 || o1 == 16) || // 15.0.0.0/7 - Hewlett-Packard Company
           (o1 == 56) || // 56.0.0.0/8 - US Postal Service
           (o1 == 10) || // 10.0.0.0/8 - Internal network
           (o1 == 192 && o2 == 168) || // 192.168.0.0/16 - Internal network
           (o1 == 172 && o2 >= 16 && o2 < 32) || // 172.16.0.0/14 - Internal network
           (o1 == 100 && o2 >= 64 && o2 < 127) || // 100.64.0.0/10 - IANA NAT reserved
           (o1 == 169 && o2 > 254) || // 169.254.0.0/16 - IANA NAT reserved
           (o1 == 198 && o2 >= 18 && o2 < 20) || // 198.18.0.0/15 - IANA Special use
           (o1 >= 224) || // 224.*.*.*+ - Multicast
           (o1 == 6 || o1 == 7 || o1 == 11 || o1 == 21 || o1 == 22 || o1 == 26 || o1 == 28 || o1 == 29 || o1 == 30 ||
            o1 == 33 || o1 == 55 || o1 == 214 || o1 == 215) // Department of Defense
    );

    return INET_ADDR(o1,o2,o3,o4);
}
```

*Remember how to do sub-netting from CIS 81?*

*The comment for HP is incorrect. What should it be?*

*Put your answer in the chat window.*



# Mirai

# Obfuscation

## Mirai Hex Codes and Obfuscation

Portions of the Mirai source code contain obfuscated hex codes.

```
cd mirai-botnet/Mirai-Source-Code-master/mirai/bot/
vi table.c
```


```
add_entry(TABLE_KILLER_PROC, "\x0D\x52\x50\x4D\x41\x0D\x22", 7);
add_entry(TABLE_KILLER_EXE, "\x0D\x47\x5A\x47\x22", 5);
add_entry(TABLE_KILLER_DELETED, "\x02\x0A\x46\x47\x4E\x47\x56\x47\x46\x0B\x22", 11);
add_entry(TABLE_KILLER_FD, "\x0D\x44\x46\x22", 4);
add_entry(TABLE_KILLER_ANIME, "\x0C\x43\x4C\x4B\x4F\x47\x22", 7);
add_entry(TABLE_KILLER_STATUS, "\x0D\x51\x56\x43\x56\x57\x51\x22", 8);
add_entry(TABLE_MEM_QBOT, "\x70\x67\x72\x6D\x70\x76\x02\x07\x51\x18\x07\x51\x22", 13);
add_entry(TABLE_MEM_QBOT2, "\x6A\x76\x76\x72\x64\x6E\x6D\x6D\x66\x22", 10);
add_entry(TABLE_MEM_QBOT3, "\x6E\x6D\x6E\x6C\x6D\x65\x76\x64\x6D\x22", 10);
```

*The table\_init function in table.c*

## Mirai Hex Codes and Obfuscation

There is a bash decode script in `~/bin` (on your path) that will decode the Mirai bot hexcodes

```
decode \x48\x57\x43\x4C\x56\x47\x41\x4A
```



```
cis76@rouji:~  
[cis76@rouji ~]$ decode \x48\x57\x43\x4C\x56\x47\x41\x4A  
juantech  
[cis76@rouji ~]$
```

*Use decode then paste the in hex codes as the argument.*



## Activity

View the table.c code

```
cd mirai-botnet/Mirai-Source-Code-master/mirai/bot/  
vi table.c
```

```
add_entry(TABLE_KILLER_PROC, "\x0D\x52\x50\x4D\x41\x0D\x22", 7);  
add_entry(TABLE_KILLER_EXE, "\x0D\x47\x5A\x47\x22", 5);  
add_entry(TABLE_KILLER_DELETED, "\x02\x0A\x46\x47\x4E\x47\x56\x47\x46\x0B\x22", 11);  
add_entry(TABLE_KILLER_FD, "\x0D\x44\x46\x22", 4);  
add_entry(TABLE_KILLER_ANIME, "\x0C\x43\x4C\x4B\x4F\x47\x22", 7);  
add_entry(TABLE_KILLER_STATUS, "\x0D\x51\x56\x43\x56\x57\x51\x22", 8);  
add_entry(TABLE_MEM_QBOT, "\x70\x67\x72\x6D\x70\x76\x02\x07\x51\x18\x07\x51\x22", 13);  
add_entry(TABLE_MEM_QBOT2, "\x6A\x76\x76\x72\x64\x6E\x6D\x6D\x66\x22", 10);  
add_entry(TABLE_MEM_QBOT3, "\x6E\x6D\x6E\x6C\x6D\x65\x76\x64\x6D\x22", 10);
```

*Decode the TABLE\_KILLER\_SAFE entry to get a URL. Visit the URL in a browser.*

*What do you see? Put your answer in the chat window.*

1. In a terminal decode a random entry in the table of hex codes in table.c, for example:

```
add_entry(TABLE_ATK_CONTENT_TYPE, "\x61\x4D\x4C\x56\x47\x4C\x56\x0F\x76\x5B\x52\x47\x18\x02\x43\x52\x52\x4E\x4B\x41\x43\x56\x4B\x4D\x4C\x0D\x5A\x0F\x55\x55\x55\x0F\x44\x4D\x50\x4F\x0F\x57\x50\x4E\x47\x4C\x41\x4D\x46\x47\x46\x22", 48);
```


Hex codes

```
[cis76@rouji ~]$ decode \x61\x4D\x4C\x56\x47\x4C\x56\x0F\x76\x5B\x52\x47\x18\x02\x43\x52\x52\x4E\x4B\x41\x43\x56\x4B\x4D\x4C\x0D\x5A\x0F\x55\x55\x55\x0F\x44\x4D\x50\x4F\x0F\x57\x50\x4E\x47\x4C\x41\x4D\x46\x47\x46\x22
```

```
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded_22
```

Decoded string

2. Copy the decoded string to the clipboard.
3. In CCC Confer, click the text icon, then paste the decode string into the correct table cell



TABLE_ATK_ACCEPT_LNG	
TABLE_ATK_CONTENT_TYPE	Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded_22
TABLE_ATK_SET_COOKIE	
TABLE_ATK_REFRESH_HDR	
TABLE_ATK_LOCATION_HDR	

# Decode Activity on CCC Confer Whiteboard

TABLE_CNC_DOMAIN	
TABLE_CNC_PORT	
TABLE_SCAN_CB_DOMAIN	
TABLE_SCAN_CB_PORT	
TABLE_EXEC_SUCCESS	
TABLE_KILLER_SAFE	
TABLE_KILLER_PROC	
TABLE_KILLER_EXE	
TABLE_KILLER_DELETED	
TABLE_KILLER_FD	
TABLE_KILLER_ANIME	
TABLE_KILLER_STATUS	
TABLE_MEM_QBOT	
TABLE_MEM_QBOT2	
TABLE_MEM_QBOT3	
TABLE_MEM_UPX	
TABLE_MEM_ZOLLARD	
TABLE_MEM_REMAITEN	
TABLE_SCAN_SHELL	
TABLE_SCAN_ENABLE	
TABLE_SCAN_SYSTEM	
TABLE_SCAN_SH	
TABLE_SCAN_QUERY	
TABLE_SCAN_RESP	
TABLE_SCAN_NCORRECT	

# Decode Activity on CCC Confer Whiteboard

TABLE_SCAN_PS	
TABLE_SCAN_KILL_9	
TABLE_ATK_VSE	
TABLE_ATK_RESOLVER	
TABLE_ATK_NSERV	
TABLE_ATK_KEEP_ALIVE	
TABLE_ATK_ACCEPT	
TABLE_ATK_ACCEPT_LNG	
TABLE_ATK_CONTENT_TYPE	
TABLE_ATK_SET_COOKIE	
TABLE_ATK_REFRESH_HDR	
TABLE_ATK_LOCATION_HDR	
TABLE_ATK_SET_COOKIE_HDR	
TABLE_ATK_CONTENT_LENGTH_HDR	
TABLE_ATK_TRANSFER_ENCODING_HDR	
TABLE_ATK_CHUNKED	
TABLE_ATK_KEEP_ALIVE_HDR	
TABLE_ATK_CONNECTION_HDR	
TABLE_ATK_DOSARREST	
TABLE_ATK_CLOUDFLARE_NGINX	
TABLE_HTTP_ONE	
TABLE_HTTP_TWO	
TABLE_HTTP_THREE	
TABLE_HTTP_FOUR	
TABLE_HTTP_FIVE	



# EC-Council Mini CEH Assessment (2nd Attempt)

# EC-Council

Browser: About - EC-Council  
 URL: https://www.eccouncil.org/about/

Navigation: HOME, PROGRAMS, FIND TRAINING, EVENTS, DEGREE OPTIONS, RESOURCES, ABOUT

## Who We Are

International Council of E-Commerce Consultants, also known as EC-Council, is the world's largest cyber security technical certification body. We operate in 140 countries globally and we are the owner and developer of the world-famous Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH), Computer Hacking Forensics Investigator (C|HFI), Certified Security Analyst (ECSA), License Penetration Testing (Practical) programs, among others. We are proud to have trained and certified over 140,000 information security professionals globally that have influenced the cyber security mindset of countless organizations worldwide.

Our certification programs are recognized worldwide and have received endorsements from various government agencies including the US Federal Government via the Montgomery GI Bill, and the US Government National Security Agency (NSA) and the Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) certifying EC-Council's Certified Ethical Hacking (CEH), Network Security Administrator (ENSA), Computer Hacking Forensics Investigator (CHFI), Disaster Recovery Professional (EDRP), Certified Security Analyst (E|CSA) and Licensed Penetration Tester(LPT) program for meeting the 4011, 4012, 4013A, 4014, 4015 and 4016 training standards for information security professionals and most recently EC-Council has received accreditation from the American National Standards Institute (ANSI).

***"Our lives are dedicated to the mitigation and remediation of the cyber plaque that is menacing the world today "***

Jay Bavisi  
 President & CEO  
 EC-Council



## EC-Council

### Our Mission

The EC-Council mission is “to validate information security professionals who are equipped with the necessary skills and knowledge required in a specialized information security domain that will help them avert a cyber conflict, should the need ever arise.” EC-Council is committed to uphold the highest level of impartiality and objectivity in its practices, decision making, and authority in all matters related to certification.



# EC-Council

The screenshot shows a web browser window displaying the EC-Council website. The browser's address bar shows the URL <https://www.eccouncil.org/programs/certified-ethical-hacker-ceh/ceh-assessment/>. The website header includes the tagline "Hackers are here. Where are you?", the EC-Council logo, a "GET TRAINING!" button, and social media icons for Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and LinkedIn. A navigation menu contains links for HOME, PROGRAMS, FIND TRAINING, EVENTS, DEGREE OPTIONS, RESOURCES, and ABOUT. The main content area features a large image of a laptop, a smartphone, and a tablet, with the word "Assessment" overlaid. Below this is a section titled "CEH ASSESSMENT" with a progress indicator showing "4/50". The current question is: "Penetration testing is a method of actively evaluating the security of an information system or network by simulating an attack from a malicious source. Which of the following technique is used to simulate an attack from someone who is unfamiliar with the system?"


## EC-Council Mini-Assessment

**Acceptable. For a muggle. You scored 60%**

*Our baseline to beat tonight*

# EC-Council Mini-Assessment Q1-10

<https://www.eccouncil.org/programs/certified-ethical-hacker-ceh/ceh-assessment/>



*Questions 1-10 (five minutes)*



# Housekeeping




## Housekeeping

1. Lab 7 due by 11:59PM (Opus time) tonight. PDFs with full non-cropped screenshots are preferred.
2. Second test next week!
3. Practice test available after class.

## Test #2

1. Test #2 is **scheduled for our next class!** Same format as before. The test will start during the last hour of class. If you work you can take it later in the day as long as it is completed by 11:59PM.
2. Practice Test #2 will be available after class on Canvas!
3. Work the Practice Test BEFORE the real test begins.
4. The practice test will not be available after the real test starts.

# Microsoft Academic Webstore




- Microsoft software for students registered in a CIS or CS class at Cabrillo
- Available after registration is final (two weeks after first class)

To get to this page, go to **<http://simms-teach.com/resources>** and click on the appropriate link in the Tools and Software section



## VMware Academic Webstore



- VMware software for students registered in a CIS or CS class at Cabrillo
- Available after registration is final (two weeks after first class)

To get to this page, go to **<http://simms-teach.com/resources>** and click on the appropriate link in the Tools and Software section

## Heads up on Final Exam

Test #3 (final exam) is **THURSDAY Dec 15 4-6:50PM**

<b>Thur</b>	12/15	<b>Test #3 (the final exam)</b>	5 posts <a href="#">Lab X1</a> <a href="#">Lab X2</a>
		<b>Time</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Thu 4:00PM - 6:50PM in Room 828</li> </ul> <b>Materials</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Test (<a href="#">canvas</a>)</li> </ul> <b>CCC Confer</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">Enter virtual classroom</a></li> <li>• Archives <a href="#">Confer</a> or <a href="#">3CMedia</a></li> </ul>	

*Extra credit  
labs and  
final posts  
due by  
11:59PM*

- All students will take the test at the same time. The test must be completed by **6:50PM**.
- Working and long distance students can take the test online via CCC Confer and Canvas.
- Working students will need to plan ahead to arrange time off from work for the test.
- Test #3 is mandatory (even if you have all the points you want)

## STARTING CLASS TIME/DAY(S)

## EXAM HOUR

## EXAM DATE

*Classes starting between:*

6:30 am and 8:55 am, MW/Daily	7:00 am-9:50 am	Wednesday, December 14
9:00 am and 10:15 am, MW/Daily	7:00 am-9:50 am	
10:20 am and 11:35 am, MW/Daily	10:00 am-12:50 pm	
11:40 am and 12:55 pm, MW/Daily	10:00 am-12:50 pm	
1:00 pm and 2:15 pm, MW/Daily	1:00 pm-3:50 pm	
2:20 pm and 3:35 pm, MW/Daily	1:00 pm-3:50 pm	
3:40 pm and 5:30 pm, MW/Daily	4:00 pm-6:50 pm	
6:30 am and 8:55 am, TTh	7:00 am-9:50 am	
9:00 am and 10:15 am, TTh	7:00 am-9:50 am	
10:20 am and 11:35 am, TTh	10:00 am-12:50 pm	
11:40 am and 12:55 pm, TTh	10:00 am-12:50 pm	
1:00 pm and 2:15 pm, TTh	1:00 pm-3:50 pm	Thursday, December 15
2:20 pm and 3:35 pm, TTh	1:00 pm-3:50 pm	Tuesday, December 13
3:40 pm and 5:30 pm, TTh	4:00 pm-6:50 pm	Thursday, December 15
Friday am	9:00 am-11:50 am	Friday, December 16
Friday pm	1:00 pm-3:50 pm	Friday, December 16
Saturday am	9:00 am-11:50 am	Saturday, December 17
Saturday pm	1:00 pm-3:50 pm	Saturday, December 17

### CIS 76 Introduction to Information Assurance

Introduces the various methodologies for attacking a network. Prerequisite: CIS 75.  
Transfer Credit: Transfers to CSU

Section	Days	Times	Units	Instructor	Room
95024	Arr.	Arr.	3.00	R.Simms	OL
&	Arr.	Arr.		R.Simms	OL
95025	T	5:30PM-8:35PM	3.00	R.Simms	828
&	Arr.	Arr.		R.Simms	OL

Section 95024 is an ONLINE course. Meets weekly throughout the semester online by remote technology with an additional 50 min online lab per week. For details, see instructor's web page at [go.cabrillo.edu/online](http://go.cabrillo.edu/online).

Section 95025 is a Hybrid ONLINE course. Meets weekly throughout the semester at the scheduled times with an additional 50 min online lab per week. For details, see instructor's web page at [go.cabrillo.edu/online](http://go.cabrillo.edu/online).


**Evening Classes:** For the final exam schedule, Evening Classes are those that begin at 5:35 pm or later. Also, **"M & W"** means the class meets on **BOTH** Monday and Wednesday. **"T & TH"** means the class meets on **BOTH** Tuesday and Thursday. The following schedule applies to all Evening Classes.



# EC-Council Mini CEH Assessment (2nd Attempt)

# EC-Council Mini-Assessment Q11-20

<https://www.eccouncil.org/programs/certified-ethical-hacker-ceh/ceh-assessment/>




*Questions 11-20 (five minutes)*



# Red and Blue Pods




## Red and Blue Pods in Microlab Lab Rack





# EC-Council Mini-Assessment Q21-30

<https://www.eccouncil.org/programs/certified-ethical-hacker-ceh/ceh-assessment/>



*Questions 21-30 (five minutes)*

# Domain 3



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# Domain 3

## Scanning Networks



# Objectives

- Understand the differences between port scanning, network scanning and vulnerability scanning
- Describe the objectives of scanning
- Identify TCP communication flag types
- Identify types of port scans
- Identify scanning countermeasures

# Scanning

## Port Scanning

- Examine a range of IP addresses
- Identify services running

## Network Scanning

- Identify active hosts on a network
- Examine the activity on a network like monitoring data flow and the functioning of network devices

## Vulnerability Scanning

- Proactively identify security vulnerabilities of systems on a network to determine where a system can be exploited

# Objectives of Scanning

Detect the live systems running on a network

Discover what ports are open

Discover the operating system of the target

Discover the services running and/or listening


Discover IP addresses

Identify specific applications

Identify vulnerabilities in any of the systems in the network



# Scanning Methodology




# Three Way Handshake


System 1 sends SYN packet to System 2

System 2 responds with SYN/ACK packet


System 1 sends ACK packet to System 2 and communications can then proceed



# TCP Flags



# Types of Port Scans



# Using Nmap

- Nmap without any switches will be successful against systems blocking ICMP
- A default Nmap scan will scan a large amount of ports, but not all
- When scanning a system on the Internet, you will not see a MAC address


5 ports are open

```
root@bt:~# nmap 216.1.1.1
Starting Nmap 6.01 ( http://nmap.org ) at 2013-02-22 13:32 EST
Nmap scan report for 216.1.1.1
Host is up (0.00045s latency).
Not shown: 995 filtered ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
21/tcp    open  ftp
23/tcp    open  telnet
25/tcp    open  smtp
80/tcp    open  http
110/tcp   open  pop3
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:31:57:28 (VMware)

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 25.83 seconds
```

# Zenmap

Zenmap is the GUI front end for nmap



	Port	Protocol	State	Service	Version
✓	21	tcp	open	ftp	Microsoft ftpd
✓	23	tcp	open	telnet	Microsoft Windows XP telnetd
✓	25	tcp	open	smtp	Microsoft ESMTP 6.0.3790.0
✓	80	tcp	open	http	Microsoft IIS httpd 6.0
✓	110	tcp	open	pop3	MS Exchange 2003 pop3d 6.5.

Scan Results

```
#Software: Microsoft Internet Information Services 6.0
#Version: 1.0
#Date: 2013-02-22 20:28:25
#Fields: date time s-ip cs-method cs-uri-stem cs-uri-query s-port cs-username c-ip cs(User-Agent) sc-status sc
2013-02-22 20:28:25 192.168.1.100 HEAD /Default.htm - 80 - 216.6.1.100 - 200 0 0
2013-02-22 20:28:56 192.168.1.100 GET /Default.htm - 80 - 216.6.1.100 - 200 0 0
2013-02-22 20:29:03 192.168.1.100 GET /Default.htm - 80 - 216.6.1.100 Mozilla/5.0+(compatible;+Nmap+Scripting+
2013-02-22 20:29:03 192.168.1.100 GET /robots.txt - 80 - 216.6.1.100 Mozilla/5.0+(compatible;+Nmap+Scripting+
2013-02-22 20:29:03 192.168.1.100 GET /Default.htm - 80 - 216.6.1.100 Mozilla/5.0+(compatible;+Nmap+Scripting+
2013-02-22 20:29:03 192.168.1.100 GET /Favicon.ico - 80 - 216.6.1.100 Mozilla/5.0+(compatible;+Nmap+Scripting+
2013-02-22 20:29:03 192.168.1.100 OPTIONS / - 80 - 216.6.1.100 Mozilla/5.0+(compatible;+Nmap+Scripting+Engine;
2013-02-22 20:29:03 192.168.1.100 OPTIONS / - 80 - 216.6.1.100 Mozilla/5.0+(compatible;+Nmap+Scripting+Engine;
2013-02-22 20:29:03 192.168.1.100 OPTIONS / - 80 - 216.6.1.100 Mozilla/5.0+(compatible;+Nmap+Scripting+Engine;
2013-02-22 20:29:03 192.168.1.100 OPTIONS / - 80 - 216.6.1.100 Mozilla/5.0+(compatible;+Nmap+Scripting+Engine;
2013-02-22 20:29:03 192.168.1.100 OPTIONS / - 80 - 216.6.1.100 Mozilla/5.0+(compatible;+Nmap+Scripting+Engine;
2013-02-22 20:29:03 192.168.1.100 OPTIONS / - 80 - 216.6.1.100 Mozilla/5.0+(compatible;+Nmap+Scripting+Engine;
2013-02-22 20:29:03 192.168.1.100 OPTIONS / - 80 - 216.6.1.100 Mozilla/5.0+(compatible;+Nmap+Scripting+Engine;
2013-02-22 20:29:03 192.168.1.100 OPTIONS / - 80 - 216.6.1.100 Mozilla/5.0+(compatible;+Nmap+Scripting+Engine;
2013-02-22 20:29:03 192.168.1.100 OPTIONS / - 80 - 216.6.1.100 Mozilla/5.0+(compatible;+Nmap+Scripting+Engine;
2013-02-22 20:29:03 192.168.1.100 OPTIONS / - 80 - 216.6.1.100 Mozilla/5.0+(compatible;+Nmap+Scripting+Engine;
```

Web Log File



# Crafting Packets

## Fping

- Ping multiple IP addresses simultaneously
- Included in BackTrack
- [www.fping.com](http://www.fping.com)

## Hping

- Perform ping sweeps
- Bypass filtering devices
- [www.hping.org/download](http://www.hping.org/download)

# fping

## man fping

```
cis76@eh-kali-05: ~
FPING (8)
NAME
    fping - send ICMP ECHO_REQUEST packets to network hosts

SYNOPSIS
    fping [ options ] [ systems... ] fping6 [ options ] [ systems... ]

DESCRIPTION
    fping is a program like ping which uses the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)
    echo request to determine if a target host is responding. fping differs from ping in
    that you can specify any number of targets on the command line, or specify a file
    containing the lists of targets to ping. Instead of sending to one target until it
    times out or replies, fping will send out a ping packet and move on to the next target
    in a round-robin fashion. In the default mode, if a target replies, it is noted and
    removed from the list of targets to check; if a target does not respond within a
    certain time limit and/or retry limit it is designated as unreachable. fping also
    supports sending a specified number of pings to a target, or looping indefinitely (as
    in ping ). Unlike ping, fping is meant to be used in scripts, so its output is designed
    to be easy to parse.

    The binary named fping6 is the same as fping, except that it uses IPv6 addresses
    instead of IPv4.

Manual page fping(8) line 1 (press h for help or q to quit)
```

*fping differs from ping in that it supports multiple targets*

# fping

## fping -h

```

cis76@eh-kali-05: ~
cis76@eh-kali-05:~$ fping -h


Usage: fping [options] [targets...]
-a          show targets that are alive
-A          show targets by address
-b n       amount of ping data to send, in bytes (default 56)
-B f       set exponential backoff factor to f
-c n       count of pings to send to each target (default 1)
-C n       same as -c, report results in verbose format
-D          print timestamp before each output line
-e          show elapsed time on return packets
-f file    read list of targets from a file ( - means stdin) (only if no -g specified)
-g         generate target list (only if no -f specified)
           (specify the start and end IP in the target list, or supply a IP netmask)
           (ex. fping -g 192.168.1.0 192.168.1.255 or fping -g 192.168.1.0/24)
-H n       Set the IP TTL value (Time To Live hops)
-i n       interval between sending ping packets (in millisec) (default 25)
-I if      bind to a particular interface
-l         loop sending pings forever
-m         ping multiple interfaces on target host
-n         show targets by name (-d is equivalent)
-O n       set the type of service (tos) flag on the ICMP packets
-p n       interval between ping packets to one target (in millisec)
           (in looping and counting modes, default 1000)
-q         quiet (don't show per-target/per-ping results)
-Q n       same as -q, but show summary every n seconds
-r n       number of retries (default 3)
-R         random packet data (to foil link data compression)
-s         print final stats
-S addr    set source address
-t n       individual target initial timeout (in millisec) (default 500)
-T n       ignored (for compatibility with fping 2.4)
-u         show targets that are unreachable
-v         show version
targets   list of targets to check (if no -f specified)

cis76@eh-kali-05:~$ █

```

# fping

```
fping 172.30.10.162 172.30.10.163 172.30.10.164
```




```
cis76@eh-kali-05: ~  
cis76@eh-kali-05:~$ fping 172.30.10.162 172.30.10.163 172.30.10.164  
172.30.10.162 is alive  
172.30.10.163 is alive  
172.30.10.164 is alive  
cis76@eh-kali-05:~$ █
```

*Multiple targets*

# fping

**fping -g 172.30.10.0/24**



```
cis76@eh-kali-05: ~  
cis76@eh-kali-05:~$ fping -g 172.30.10.0/24  
172.30.10.1 is alive  
172.30.10.2 is alive  
172.30.10.10 is alive  
172.30.10.13 is alive  
172.30.10.14 is alive  
172.30.10.16 is alive  
172.30.10.34 is alive  
172.30.10.36 is alive  
172.30.10.108 is alive  
172.30.10.109 is alive  
172.30.10.110 is alive  
172.30.10.111 is alive  
172.30.10.112 is alive  
172.30.10.113 is alive  
172.30.10.100 is alive  
172.30.10.160 is alive  
172.30.10.161 is alive  
172.30.10.162 is alive  
172.30.10.163 is alive  
172.30.10.164 is alive  
172.30.10.165 is alive  
172.30.10.166 is alive  
172.30.10.167 is alive  
172.30.10.168 is alive  
172.30.10.169 is alive  
172.30.10.170 is alive  
172.30.10.171 is alive  
172.30.10.172 is alive  
172.30.10.173 is alive  
172.30.10.174 is alive  
172.30.10.205 is alive  
172.30.10.211 is alive  
172.30.10.3 is unreachable  
172.30.10.4 is unreachable  
172.30.10.5 is unreachable  
172.30.10.6 is unreachable
```

*-g option to generate targets*

# fping

**fping < hostlist**

```
cis76@eh-kali-05: ~  
cis76@eh-kali-05:~$ cat hostlist  
172.30.10.162  
172.30.10.163  
172.30.10.164  
172.30.10.165  
172.30.10.166  
172.30.10.167  
172.30.10.168  
172.30.10.169  
172.30.10.170  
172.30.10.171  
172.30.10.172  
cis76@eh-kali-05:~$ fping < hostlist  
172.30.10.162 is alive  
172.30.10.163 is alive  
172.30.10.164 is alive  
172.30.10.165 is alive  
172.30.10.166 is alive  
172.30.10.167 is alive  
172.30.10.168 is alive  
172.30.10.169 is alive  
172.30.10.170 is alive  
172.30.10.171 is alive  
172.30.10.172 is alive  
cis76@eh-kali-05:~$
```

*fping also reads from stdin*



## Activity

Try this command from your EH-Kali VM:

```
echo 172.30.10.{1,2,10,13,14} | fmt -1 | fping
```

*How many of those devices are up? Put your answer in the chat window.*

# Scanning Countermeasures

Firewall should detect probes

Network intrusion detection systems should identify the OS detection methods used by various tools

Close any unneeded ports

Deploy tools to detect port scans




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# EC-Council Mini CEH Assessment (2nd Attempt)

# EC-Council Mini-Assessment Q31-40

<https://www.eccouncil.org/programs/certified-ethical-hacker-ceh/ceh-assessment/>



*Questions 31-40 (five minutes)*

# Domain 4



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# Domain 4

Enumeration






# Objectives

- Understand enumeration techniques
- Describe null sessions
- Describe SNMP enumeration
- Identify countermeasures

# Steps to Compromise a System



# Enumeration

Network resources  
and shares


Users and groups

Actively connect  
to obtain  
information

Auditing settings

Application banners

# Null Session Enumeration



# Null Sessions

## Enumeration Techniques

- Exploit IPC\$ share
- Exploit hard drive
- Enumerate user account

## Countermeasures

- Filter ports
- Disable SMB service
- Inspect HKLM
- Configure security policy
- Restrict remote access

```
net use \\192.168.1.101\ipc$ "" /user:""
```

# NetBIOS Basics

Windows programming interface that allows computers to communicate across a LAN

Used to share files and printers

Uses UDP ports 137 (Server service), 138 (Datagram service) and TCP port 139 (Session service)

NetBIOS names are the computer names assigned to a system and have a 15-character limit

NetBIOS name must be unique on a network

# Command Line Tools

**netstat**

- Displays network connections, routing tables and network protocol statistics

**nbstat**

- Diagnostic tool for NetBIOS
- Used to troubleshoot NetBIOS name resolution problems



# SNMP Enumeration

Agents deployed onto managed systems and Network Management Stations

Process information collected

A Master Information Base (MIB) is configured with the resources that need to be monitored


Default community string are the characters PUBLIC

Attacker looks for target host with SNMP enabled and a default community string

Built-in SNMP objects will be visible for enumeration

# snmp-check

**snmp-check -h**



```
cis76@eh-kali-05: ~  
cis76@eh-kali-05:~$ snmp-check -h  
snmpcheck v1.8 - SNMP enumerator  
Copyright (c) 2005-2011 by Matteo Cantoni (www.nothink.org)  
  
Usage snmpcheck -t <IP address>  
  
-t : target host;  
  
-p : SNMP port; default port is 161;  
-c : SNMP community; default is public;  
-v : SNMP version (1,2); default is 1;  
-r : request retries; default is 0;  
  
-w : detect write access (separate action by enumeration);  
  
-d : disable 'TCP connections' enumeration!  
-T : force timeout in seconds; default is 20. Max is 60;  
-D : enable debug;  
-h : show help menu;  
  
cis76@eh-kali-05:~$
```

*Used to browse SNMP MIBs*

## Activity

Try this command from your EH-Kali VM:

```
snmp-check -t 172.30.10.162
```

*Check the Software Components section of the output. Is VMware Tools installed? Write your answer in the chat window.*

# SNMP Enumeration Countermeasures

Remove the SNMP agent or turn off the SNMP service

Implement the group policy security option

Restrict access to null session shares

Change the community string

# Discovering Hosts with Windows Command Line Tools

Here is a list of the commands used during Task 2 to enumerate Windows hosts.

Command	Result
net view	Enumerates the machines within the same workgroup
net view /domain	Enumerates all workgroups and domains
net view /domain:workgroup	Enumerates the machines in the workgroup <u>WORKGROUP</u>
net view /domain:XYZcompany	Enumerates the machines in the workgroup <u>XYZcompany</u>

# Discovering Hosts with Metasploit


```
msf auxiliary(arp_sweep) > run

[*] 192.168.1.1 appears to be up (VMware, Inc.).
[*] 192.168.1.100 appears to be up (VMware, Inc.).
[*] 192.168.1.175 appears to be up (VMware, Inc.).
[*] 192.168.1.200 appears to be up (VMware, Inc.).
[*] Scanned 256 of 256 hosts (100% complete)
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
```

```
msf auxiliary(nbname) > run

[*] Sending NetBIOS status requests to 192.168.1.0->192.168.1.255 (256 hosts)
[*] 192.168.1.1 [FW] OS:Windows Names:(FW, WORKGROUP, [??] MSBROWSE [?]) Addresses:(216.1.1.1, 192.168.1.1)
[*] 192.168.1.100 [SERVER] OS:Windows Names:(SERVER, XYZCOMPANY, [??] MSBROWSE [?]) Addresses:(192.168.1.100)
[*] 192.168.1.175 [WINXP] OS:Windows Names:(WINXP, WORKGROUP) Addresses:(192.168.1.175) Mac:00:0c:29:e0:09
[*] 192.168.1.200 [WINFILE] OS:Windows Names:(WINFILE, WORKGROUP) Addresses:(192.168.1.200) Mac:00:0c:29:c
[*] Scanned 256 of 256 hosts (100% complete)
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
```

# Using Cain



IP address	MAC address	OUI fingerprint	Host name
192.168.1.1	000C2931571E	VMware, Inc.	FW
192.168.1.50	000C294B5CBE	VMware, Inc.	
192.168.1.100	000C2943C90D	VMware, Inc.	server.xyzcompany.com
192.168.1.200	000C29C4994B	VMware, Inc.	WINFILE






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# EC-Council Mini CEH Assessment (2nd Attempt)

# EC-Council Mini-Assessment Q41-50

<https://www.eccouncil.org/programs/certified-ethical-hacker-ceh/ceh-assessment/>



*Questions 41-50 (five minutes)*

# Domain 10



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# Domain 10


Denial of Service



# Objectives

- Define a denial-of-service (DoS) attack
- Analyze symptoms of a DoS attack
- Explain DoS attack techniques
- Describe detection techniques
- Identify countermeasure strategies

# Denial-of-Service Attack





# Types of Attacks

## Smurf

- Attacker sends a lot of ICMP traffic to IP broadcast addresses with a spoofed source IP of the victim

## Buffer overflow attack

- Send excessive data to an application to bring down the application and crash the system

## Ping of death

- Send an ICMP packet that is larger than the allowed 65,536 bytes


## Teardrop

- Manipulate the value of fragments so that they overlap causing the receiving system an issue with reassembling the packet causing it to crash, hang, or reboot


## SYN Flood

- Exploits the three-way handshake by never responding to the server's response


# Botnets



# Conducting a DDoS Attack



# Distributed Denial of Service Attack (DDoS)




Handler software is placed on a compromised router or network server

Agent software is placed in compromised systems that will carry out the attack

An IRC-based DDoS attack is similar except that it is installed on a network server and uses the IRC communication channel to connect the attacker to the agents

# Attack Classes



# Amplification Attacks

## Smurf Attack

A Smurf Attack (named so as it fits the stereotype of Smurfs with proper visualization) is a denial-of-service (DoS) attack that involves **sending ICMP echo requests (ping) traffic to the broadcast address** of routers and other network devices in large computer networks with a spoofed **source address (the address of the desired DoS target)**. Since the device receiving the original ICMP echo request broadcasts it to every other device it's connected to, each one of these devices sends out an echo reply to the spoofed source address (the DoS target). This will generate a high rate of ICMP traffic and could cause DoS or instability for the target network.

If the original request (to a device in a large network) is broadcast to such a vast number of machines, the resulting attack can be highly effective. After 1999, however, most routers do not forward packets sent to their broadcast addresses by default, this makes the likelihood of a successful large-scale Smurf Attack fairly low.

# Amplification Attacks


## Fraggle Attack

A Fraggle Attack is a denial-of-service (DoS) attack that involves sending a large amount of spoofed UDP traffic to a router's broadcast address within a network. It is very similar to a Smurf Attack, which uses spoofed ICMP traffic rather than UDP traffic to achieve the same goal. Given those routers (as of 1999) no longer forward packets directed at their broadcast addresses, most networks are now immune to Fraggle (and Smurf) attacks.


<https://security.radware.com/ddos-knowledge-center/ddospedia/fraggle-attack/>




# Countermeasures



# Countermeasures



# Countermeasures



# Performing a DoS Attack

```
tcpdump -i eth1 -nntttt -s 0 -w dos.pcap -C 1000
```



Interface   format   size   file name   PCAP size

Capture network traffic with Tcpcap

```
root@bt:~# hping3 -S -p 80 --flood 216.1.1.1
HPING 216.1.1.1 (eth0 216.1.1.1): S set, 40 headers + 0 data bytes
hping in flood mode, no replies will be shown
```

Command used to start the DoS attack

164125	2013-01-23	14:09:03.324754	216.1.1.1	216.6.1.100	TCP	http > 36013 [RST, ACK]
164126	2013-01-23	14:09:03.324754	216.1.1.1	216.6.1.100	TCP	http > 36014 [RST, ACK]
164127	2013-01-23	14:09:03.324755	216.1.1.1	216.6.1.100	TCP	http > 36015 [RST, ACK]
164128	2013-01-23	14:09:03.324755	216.1.1.1	216.6.1.100	TCP	http > 36016 [RST, ACK]

Sample DoS Packets



This workforce solution was funded by a grant awarded by the U.S. Department of Labor's Employment and Training Administration. The solution was created by the grantee and does not necessarily reflect the official position of the U.S. Department of Labor. The Department of Labor makes no guarantees, warranties, or assurances of any kind, express or implied, with respect to such information, including any information on linked sites and including, but not limited to, accuracy, continued availability or ownership.



# Assignment





*No Lab assignment this week*

*Test next week*

*Practice test available on Canvas*





# Wrap up

## Next Class

Assignment: Check the Calendar Page on the web site to see what is due next week.

No Quiz

No Lab due

Test!



# Backup