Rich's lesson module checklist

- ❑ Slides and lab posted
- ❑ WB converted from PowerPoint
- ❑ Print out agenda slide and annotate page numbers

- ❑ Flash cards
- ❑ Properties
- ❑ Page numbers
- ❑ 1st minute quiz
- ❑ Web Calendar summary
- ❑ Web book pages
- ❑ Commands

- ❑ Practice Test #3 tested and ready to go

- ❑ Backup slides, whiteboard slides, CCC info, handouts on flash drive
- ❑ Spare 9v battery for mic
- ❑ Key card for classroom door

- ❑ Update CCC Confer and 3C Media portals

Last updated 12/6/2016



Student Learner Outcomes

1. Defend a computer and a LAN against a variety of different types of security attacks using a number of hands-on techniques.

2. Defend a computer and a LAN against a variety of different types of security attacks using a number of hands-on techniques.

Introductions and Credits

Rich Simms
- HP Alumnus.
- Started teaching in 2008 when Jim Griffin went on sabbatical.
- Rich's site: http://simms-teach.com

And thanks to:
- Steven Bolt at for his WASTC EH training.
- Kevin Vaccaro for his CSSIA EH training and Netlab+ pods.
- EC-Council for their online self-paced CEH v9 course.
- Sam Bowne for his WASTC seminars, textbook recommendation and fantastic EH website (https://samsclass.info/).
- Lisa Bock for her great lynda.com EH course.
- John Govsky for many teaching best practices: e.g. the First Minute quizzes, the online forum, and the point grading system (http://teacherjohn.com/).
- Google for everything else!

Student checklist for attending class



1. Browse to: **http://simms-teach.com**
2. Click the **CIS 76** link.
3. Click the **Calendar** link.
4. Locate today's lesson.
5. Find the **Presentation slides** for the lesson and **download** for easier viewing.
6. Click the **Enter virtual classroom** link to join CCC Confer.
7. Log into Opus with Putty or ssh command.

Note: Blackboard Collaborate Launcher only needs to be installed once. It has already been downloaded and installed on the classroom PC's.

Student checklist for suggested screen layout

- ❑ *Google*
- ❑ *CCC Confer*
- ❑ *Downloaded PDF of Lesson Slides*



- ❑ *CIS 76 website Calendar page*
- ❑ *One or more login sessions to Opus*

Student checklist for sharing desktop with classmates

1) Instructor gives you sharing privileges.



2) Click overlapping rectangles icon. If white "Start Sharing" text is present then click it as well.



3) Click OK button.



4) Select "Share desktop" and click Share button.

Rich's CCC Confer checklist - setup

[ ] Preload White Board



[ ] Connect session to Teleconference

Session now connected to teleconference





[ ] Is recording on?



Red dot means recording

[ ] Use teleconferencing, not mic

Should be grayed out



Should change from phone handset icon to little Microphone icon and the Teleconferencing … message displayed

Rich's CCC Confer checklist - screen layout



[ ] layout and share apps

Rich's CCC Confer checklist - webcam setup



[ ] Video (webcam)

[ ] Make Video Follow Moderator Focus

Rich's CCC Confer checklist - Elmo





The "rotate image" button is necessary if you use both the side table and the white board.

Quite interesting that they consider you to be an "expert" in order to use this button!

Elmo rotated down to view side table

Elmo rotated up to view white board



Run and share the Image Mate program just as you would any other app with CCC Confer

Rich's CCC Confer checklist - universal fixes

Universal Fix for CCC Confer:

1) Shrink (500 MB) and delete Java cache
2) Uninstall and reinstall latest Java runtime
3) http://www.cccconfer.org/support/technicalSupport.aspx

Control Panel (small icons)



General Tab > Settings…



500MB cache size



Delete these



Google Java download

Start

Sound Check

*Students that dial-in should mute their line using *6 to prevent unintended noises distracting the web conference.*

*Instructor can use *96 to mute all student lines.*

Volume
**4 - increase conference volume.*
**7 - decrease conference volume.*
**5 - increase your voice volume.*
**8 - decrease your voice volume.*

CIS 76 - Lesson 15

Instructor: **Rich Simms**
Dial-in: **888-886-3951**
Passcode: **136690**


Ryan


Jordan


Takashi


Michael W.


Sean


Tim


Luis


Brian


Carter


Dave R.


David H.


Roberto


Nelli


Mike C.


Deryck


Alex


Thomas


Wes


Jennifer


Marcos

Email me (risimms@cabrillo.edu) a relatively current photo of your face for 3 points extra credit

Quiz

No Quiz Today !

Network Protection Systems

Objectives

- Describe how routers protect networks
- Describe firewall technology
- Describe intrusion detection systems
- Describe honeypots

Agenda

- NO QUIZ
- Questions
- In the news
- Best practices
- Housekeeping
- Network devices
- Firewalls
- IDS and IPS
- Final project presentations
- Assignment
- Wrap up

Admonition

Unauthorized hacking is a crime.

The hacking methods and activities learned in this course can result in prison terms, large fines and lawsuits if used in an unethical manner. They may only be used in a lawful manner on equipment you own or where you have explicit permission from the owner.

Students that engage in any unethical, unauthorized or illegal hacking may be dropped from the course and will receive no legal protection or help from the instructor or the college.

Questions

Questions

How this course works?

Past lesson material?

Previous labs?

- Graded work in home directories
- Quiz answers in /home/cis76/answers

Chinese Proverb	他問一個問題，五分鐘是個傻子，他不問一個問題仍然是一個傻瓜永遠。 *He who asks a question is a fool for five minutes; he who does not ask a question remains a fool forever.*

In the news

Recent news

"Avalanche" (crimeware-as-a-service)

https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA16-336A

http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/12/legal-raids-in-five-countries-seize-botnet-servers-sinkhole-800000-domains/

http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/news/450404086/EU-US-authorities-take-down-Avalanche-global-crimeware-network

- Authorities for 30 countries have dismantled Avalanche.
- Four year investigation.
- Avalanche used as many as 500,000 infected computers world-wide.
- Cyber criminals used Avalanche botnet infrastructure to distribute malware and target over 40 financial institutions.
- Victim's lost sensitive personal information.
- Victim's compromised systems used in the botnet.
- Used "money mule" schemes to transport or launder stolen money.
- Used fast flux DNS techniques (changing DNS records frequently) to hide from authorities.

Recent news

Tor network compromised

http://www.techspot.com/news/57583-hackers-have-compromised-the-once-anonymous-tor-network.html

Thanks Marcos

- Tor allows users to anonymously browse the Internet.
- Unknown attackers gathered information on sites users visited.
- Not likely to have seen what pages were loaded.
- They monitored Tor traffic relays to gather information.
- They introduced hundreds of their own traffic relays into the network.
- Tor project suspects attackers were researchers in the CERT department at Carnegie Mellon.

Recent news

Android malware "Gooligan" compromises a million Google accounts

http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/11/1-million-android-accounts-compromised-by-android-malware-called-gooligan/



- A family of Android based malware that install Adware and installs apps from Google Play to raise their reputation.
- Named "Gooligan" by researchers at Check Point Software Technologies.
- Discovered 86 infected apps in third party stores.
- The malware could also get installed by malicious links in phishing messages.
- The malware uses rooting to gain privileged access.
- The rooted phones download additional software to steal Google authentication tokens.
- The tokens can be used to access Gmail, Google Docs, Google Mobile Services, Google Play, Google Drive etc. without a password.

Recent news

Russian bank hacked

http://www.wsj.com/articles/hackers-steal-31-million-from-accounts-at-russian-central-bank-1480701080

https://www.hackread.com/russian-central-bank-hacked-31-mil-gone/

- 2 billion rubles ($31.3 million) was stolen by hackers.
- They attempted stealing 5 billion rubles but thwarted by the bank's intervention.
- A few weeks ago Russian banks experienced a string of DDoS attacks.
- An FSB investigation found the attack was carried out by servers based in the Netherlands.
- In addition the FSB investigation found fake stories were planted on social media, using servers in the Ukraine, attempting to discredit the Russian banking system and that it was close to collapse.

Recent news

San Francisco Muni hit by ransomware

http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/11/san-francisco-transit-ransomware-attacker-likely-used-year-old-java-exploit/

http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/11/san-francisco-muni-hit-by-black-friday-ransomware-attack/



You hacked, all Data Encrypted,Contact For Key(cryptom27@Yandex.com) ID:601 ,EnterKey:

- Attack on Black Friday on the Muni's network took down ticketing machines, servers and agent desktops.
- Hackers demanded 100 bit-coins ($73,000).
- Appears they took advantage of a "deserialization" vulnerability in a Oracle WebLogic server.
- Used malware known as Mamba and HDDCryptor which attacks the victim's network and all the computers on that network.
- It appears the Muni was not specifically targeted but was a target of opportunity in a vulnerability scan.
- Passengers rode for free that day.

Best Practices

Best Practices

Gooligan Checker



https://gooligan.checkpoint.com/

Best Practices

Beginners guide to beefing up your online privacy and security



http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/12/a-beginners-guide-to-beefing-up-your-privacy-and-security-online/

- Install updates (especially browser and OS).
- Use strong passwords and passcodes.
- Encrypt your phones and computers.
- Use two-factor authentication.
- Use a password managers (example products, 1Passord and LastPass).
- Encrypt SMS and voice calls (example products, Signal).
- Use VPNs on public Wi-Fi (example services, Private Internet Access).
- Secure end-to-end email (example ProtonMail).
- Delete old emails.
- For more in-depth strategies see EFF's Surveillance Self-Defense page.

https://ssd.eff.org/

Housekeeping

Housekeeping

1. Don't forget to submit your project tonight by 11:59PM!
   - By email to risimms@cabrillo.edu
   - Or put a copy in the Student Project Folder using the link on the Calendar page. Be sure share permissions on your document allow me to read it.

2. All four extra credit labs are available (15 points each) and due the day of the final exam.

3. Last five forum posts are due the day of the final exam.

4. The final exam (Test #3) is next week and the practice test is available now.

CIS 76 Project

The lab you create should contain the following sections:

a) Title, your name, date and course number.
b) Overview - short introductory paragraph summarizing the lab.
c) Admonition - a warning to the reader against unauthorized hacking.
d) Requirements - everything needed to create a secure test bed and demonstrate the attack.
e) The vulnerability(ies) - description and history including reference citations.
f) The exploit(s) - description of the exploit and how it works including reference citations.
g) Setup - step-by-step instructions with screen shots demonstrating how to set up the test bed, configure systems and networks including reference citations.
h) Attack - step-by-step instructions with screen shots on how to carry out the attack including reference citations.
i) Prevention - list of preventative measures for preventing the attack including reference citations.
j) Appendix A - List of references for each citation.
k) Appendix B - Test reports you received from classmates that tested your lab.
l) Appendix C - Other classmate's labs you tested.

Excerpt from the Project document

CIS 76 Project

Grading Rubric (60 points + 30 points extra credit)

Up to 5 points - Professional quality document containing all sections mentioned above.
Up to 3 points - Description and history of vulnerability.
Up to 3 points - Description of exploit and how it works.
Up to 3 points - Document all equipment, software and materials required.
Up to 10 points - Document step-by-step instructions to set up the test bed.
Up to 15 points - Document step-by-step instructions to carry out the attack.
Up to 3 points - List of best practices to prevent future attacks.
Up to 15 points - Testing another student's lab (see below).
Up to 3 points - Presentation and demo to class (10 minutes max).

Extra credit (up 30 points) 15 points each for testing additional student labs. You must use the testing spreadsheet above so that all projects get tested equally.

Remember late work is not accepted. If you run out of time submit what you have completed for partial credit.

Excerpt from the Project document

Final Exam

Test #3 (final exam) is THURSDAY Dec 15 4:00PM-6:50PM

Thur	12/15	**Test #3 (the final exam)** **Time** • Thu 4:00PM - 6:50PM in Room 828 **Materials** • Test (canvas) **CCC Confer** • Enter virtual classroom • Archives Confer or 3CMedia		5 posts Lab X1 Lab X2 Lab X3 Lab X4

- All students will take the test at the same time. The test must be completed by 6:50PM.
- Working and long distance students can take the test online via CCC Confer and Canvas.
- Working students will need to plan ahead to arrange time off from work for the test.
- Test #3 is mandatory (even if you have all the points you want)

STARTING CLASS TIME/DAY(S) *Classes starting between:*	EXAM HOUR	EXAM DATE
6:30 am and 8:55 am, MW/Daily	7:00 am-9:50 am	Wednesday, December 14
9:00 am and 10:15 am, MW/Daily	7:00 am-9:50 am	
10:20 am and 11:35 am, MW/Daily	10:00 am-12:50 pm	
11:40 am and 12:55 pm, MW/Daily	10:00 am-12:50 pm	
1:00 pm and 2:15 pm, MW/Daily	1:00 pm-3:50 pm	
2:20 pm and 3:35 pm, MW/Daily	1:00 pm-3:50 pm	
3:40 pm and 5:30 pm, MW/Daily	4:00 pm-6:50 pm	
6:30 am and 8:55 am, TTh	7:00 am-9:50 am	
9:00 am and 10:15 am, TTh	7:00 am-9:50 am	
10:20 am and 11:35 am, TTh	10:00 am-12:50 pm	
11:40 am and 12:55 pm, TTH	10:00 am-12:50 pm	
1:00 pm and 2:15 pm, TTh	1:00 pm-3:50 pm	Thursday, December 15
2:20 pm and 3:35 pm, TTh	1:00 pm-3:50 pm	Tuesday, December 13
3:40 pm and 5:30 pm, TTh	4:00 pm-6:50 pm	Thursday, December 15
Friday am	9:00 am-11:50 am.	Friday, December 16
Friday pm	1:00 pm-3:50 pm	Friday, December 16
Saturday am	9:00 am-11:50 am	Saturday, December 17
Saturday pm	1:00 pm-3:50 pm	Saturday, December 17

CIS 76 Introduction to Information Assurance

Introduces the various methodologies for attacking a network. Prerequisite: CIS 75. Transfer Credit: Transfers to CSU

Section	Days	Times	Units	Instructor	Room
95024	Arr.	Arr.	3.00	R.Simms	OL
&	Arr.	Arr.		R.Simms	OL

Section 95024 is an ONLINE course. Meets weekly throughout the semester online by remote technology with an additional 50 min online lab per week. For details, see instructor's web page at go.cabrillo.edu/online.

95025	**T**	**5:30PM-8:35PM**	**3.00**	**R.Simms**	**828**
&	Arr.	Arr.		R.Simms	OL

Section 95025 is a Hybrid ONLINE course. Meets weekly throughout the semester at the scheduled times with an additional 50 min online lab per week. For details, see instructor's web page at go.cabrillo.edu/online.

Evening Classes: For the final exam schedule, Evening Classes are those that begin at 5:35 pm or later. Also, **"M & W"** means the class meets on **BOTH** Monday and Wednesday. **"T & TH"** means the class meets on **BOTH** Tuesday and Thursday. The following schedule applies to all Evening Classes.

Where to find your grades

Send me your survey to get your LOR code name.

The CIS 76 website Grades page

http://simms-teach.com/cis76grades.php



Or check on Opus

checkgrades *codename*

(where codename is your LOR codename)



Written by Jesse Warren a past CIS 90 Alumnus

Percentage	Total Points	Letter Grade	Pass/No Pass
90% or higher	504 or higher	A	Pass
80% to 89.9%	448 to 503	B	Pass
70% to 79.9%	392 to 447	C	Pass
60% to 69.9%	336 to 391	D	No pass
0% to 59.9%	0 to 335	F	No pass

At the end of the term I'll add up all your points and assign you a grade using this table

Points that could have been earned:

10 quizzes:	30 points
10 labs:	300 points
2 tests:	60 points
3 forum quarters:	60 points
Total:	**450 points**

Red and Blue Teams

Red and Blue Pods in Microlab Lab Rack



Send me an email if you would like to join a team

Network Devices

Various Network Devices



Hypothetical topology of switches, routers, firewalls, IDS, IPS and honeypots

Routers

Routers

- Routers are at the intersection of multiple network segments.
- They operate at Layer 3 the "Network" layer.
- Routers look at a packet's destination IP address and a routing table to decide where to forward a packet. Kind of like using a sign post in Europe to decide which direction to go.
- If there is no route for a packet's destination, the packet is dropped.

https://www.flickr.com/photos/13426843@N08/4291372540

https://www.flickr.com/photos/38109472@N00/4237980827


Routers


Configuring the routes in routing tables

- Manually - you can add static routes by hand. This does not work though if you have lots of routers to configure.
- Dynamic - routing protocols cans be used between participating routers to automatically calculate and populate routing tables with the best routes. Example routing protocols are RIP, OSPF, BGP, EIGRP, etc.

https://www.flickr.com/photos/13426843@N08/4291372540

https://www.flickr.com/photos/38109472@N00/4237980827

Example Cisco Routing Table

```
R3#show ip route
Codes: C - connected, S - static, I - IGRP, R - RIP, M - mobile, B - BGP
       D - EIGRP, EX - EIGRP external, O - OSPF, IA - OSPF inter area
       N1 - OSPF NSSA external type 1, N2 - OSPF NSSA external type 2
       E1 - OSPF external type 1, E2 - OSPF external type 2, E - EGP
       i - IS-IS, L1 - IS-IS level-1, L2 - IS-IS level-2, ia - IS-IS inter area
       * - candidate default, U - per-user static route, o - ODR
       P - periodic downloaded static route

Gateway of last resort is 192.168.10.5 to network 0.0.0.0

     192.168.10.0/30 is subnetted, 3 subnets
O       192.168.10.0 [110/1952] via 192.168.10.5, 00:00:23, Serial0/0
C       192.168.10.4 is directly connected, Serial0/0
C       192.168.10.8 is directly connected, Serial0/1
     172.16.0.0/16 is variably subnetted, 2 subnets, 2 masks
C       172.16.1.32/29 is directly connected, FastEthernet0/0
O       172.16.1.16/28 [110/400] via 192.168.10.5, 00:00:23, Serial0/0
     10.0.0.0/8 is variably subnetted, 2 subnets, 2 masks
C       10.3.3.3/32 is directly connected, Loopback0
O       10.10.10.0/24 [110/791] via 192.168.10.9, 00:00:24, Serial0/1
O*E2 0.0.0.0/0 [110/1] via 192.168.10.5, 00:00:24, Serial0/0
R3#
```



Example Linux Routing Table

```
Legolas route -n output
-----------------------
Destination     Gateway         Genmask         Flags Metric Ref    Use Iface
192.168.3.0     0.0.0.0         255.255.255.252 U     0      0        0 eth0
192.168.3.4     0.0.0.0         255.255.255.252 U     0      0        0 eth1
192.168.3.8     192.168.3.1     255.255.255.252 UG    2      0        0 eth0
10.10.3.0       0.0.0.0         255.255.255.0   U     0      0        0 eth2
169.254.0.0     0.0.0.0         255.255.0.0     U     1002   0        0 eth0
169.254.0.0     0.0.0.0         255.255.0.0     U     1003   0        0 eth1
169.254.0.0     0.0.0.0         255.255.0.0     U     1004   0        0 eth2
172.20.0.0      192.168.3.1     255.255.0.0     UG    2      0        0 eth0
0.0.0.0         192.168.3.1     0.0.0.0         UG    2      0        0 eth0
```



pod=your pod number, *xxx*=one of your assigned IP addresses


Routers


Unfortunately routers can be hacked like everything else

- Vulnerabilities in router operating systems.
- Vulnerabilities in the software that configures or manages routers.
- They can be misconfigured by mistake.
- Tricking them into adding fraudulent routes into their routing tables.

https://www.flickr.com/photos/13426843@N08/4291372540

https://www.flickr.com/photos/38109472@N00/4237980827

Cisco IOS Vulnerabilities



http://www.cvedetails.com/vendor/16/Cisco.html

Cisco IOS Vulnerabilities



Cisco IOS : List of securit | How China swallowed 15

www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list.php?vendor_id=16&product_id=19&version_id=&page=1&hasexp=0&opdos=0&opec=0&opov=0&opcsrf=0&opgpriv=0&opsqli=0&

CVE Details
The ultimate security vulnerability datasource

(e.g.: CVE-2009-1234 or 2010-1234 or 20101234) Search | View CVE

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Vendor Search
Product Search
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Vulnerability Search
By Microsoft References
Top 50 :
Vendors
Vendor Cvss Scores
Products
Product Cvss Scores
Versions
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Bugtraq Entries
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View CVE :
Go
(e.g.: CVE-2009-1234 or 2010-1234 or 20101234)

Cisco » IOS : Security Vulnerabilities

CVSS Scores Greater Than: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Sort Results By : CVE Number Descending CVE Number Ascending CVSS Score Descending Number Of Exploits Descending

Total number of vulnerabilities : **427** Page : 1 (This Page) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Copy Results Download Results

#	CVE ID	CWE ID	# of Exploits	Vulnerability Type(s)	Publish Date	Update Date	Score	Gained Access Level	Access	Complexity	Authentication	Conf.	Integ.	Avail.
1	CVE-1999-0775				1999-06-10	2008-09-09	10.0	Admin	Remote	Low	Not required	Complete	Complete	Complete
	Cisco Gigabit Switch routers running IOS allow remote attackers to forward unauthorized packets due to improper handling of the "established" keyword in an access list.													
2	CVE-2002-1357	119		DoS Exec Code Overflow	2002-12-23	2009-03-04	10.0	Admin	Remote	Low	Not required	Complete	Complete	Complete
	Multiple SSH2 servers and clients do not properly handle packets or data elements with incorrect length specifiers, which may allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly execute arbitrary code, as demonstrated by the SSHredder SSH protocol test suite.													
3	CVE-2002-1358	20		DoS Exec Code	2002-12-23	2009-03-04	10.0	Admin	Remote	Low	Not required	Complete	Complete	Complete
	Multiple SSH2 servers and clients do not properly handle lists with empty elements or strings, which may allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly execute arbitrary code, as demonstrated by the SSHredder SSH protocol test suite.													
4	CVE-2002-1359	20		DoS Exec Code Overflow	2002-12-23	2009-03-04	10.0	Admin	Remote	Low	Not required	Complete	Complete	Complete
	Multiple SSH2 servers and clients do not properly handle large packets or large fields, which may allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly execute arbitrary code via buffer overflow attacks, as demonstrated by the SSHredder SSH protocol test suite.													
5	CVE-2002-1360	20		DoS Exec Code	2002-12-23	2009-03-04	10.0	Admin	Remote	Low	Not required	Complete	Complete	Complete
	Multiple SSH2 servers and clients do not properly handle strings with null characters in them when the string length is specified by a length field, which could allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly execute arbitrary code due to interactions with the use of null-terminated strings as implemented using languages such as C, as demonstrated by the SSHredder SSH protocol test suite.													
6	CVE-2004-1464			DoS	2004-12-31	2008-09-10	10.0	None	Remote	Low	Not required	Complete	Complete	Complete
	Cisco IOS 12.2(15) and earlier allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (refused VTY (virtual terminal) connections), via a crafted TCP connection to the Telnet or reverse Telnet port.													
7	CVE-2006-4950				2006-09-23	2009-03-04	10.0	Admin	Remote	Low	Not required	Complete	Complete	Complete
	Cisco IOS 12.2 through 12.4 before 20060920, as used by Cisco IAD2430, IAD2431, and IAD2432 Integrated Access Devices, the VG224 Analog Phone Gateway, and the MWR 1900 and 1941 Mobile Wireless Edge Routers, is incorrectly identified as supporting DOCSIS, which allows remote attackers to gain read-write access via a hard-coded cable-docsis													

http://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list.php?vendor_id=16&product_id=19&version_id=&page=1&hasexp=0&opdos=0&opec=0&opov=0&opcsrf=0&opgpriv=0&opsqli=0&opxss=0&opdirt=0&opmemc=0&ophttprs=0&opbyp=0&opfileinc=0&opginf=0&cvssscoremin=0&cvssscoremax=0&year=0&month=0&cweid=0&order=3&trc=427&sha=bd51a01b646bad788bdc715f12e17fa177698ba8

Activity

According to CVE Details, what is the most common type of vulnerability found in Cisco's IOS?

Put your answer in the chat window

Cisco IOS Exploits



https://www.exploit-db.com/search/?action=search&description=cisco+ios&g-recaptcha-response=03AHJ_VuvFax5SIVvdeMeHAPTaj9pL2EKLCN5OYAvXwq1wF0d-KqrfOFrNUZUYLmuqKtoSDZg1HYfTXvHA-8HGuMVOwzk1fvWePnpS56tGGoj9Vpf3mM2iyfvOhTfijXLPr5s7v1_k_ythChKQhDEk1PPgIjYBd6nOldn3nzfAv-HABmMMrc0EagR61Y8wXgkqK5Trm75BtqHf32PkKk7wzCq-NE_pirs1R7z7VsmqBMQxuo0G1DzA1-rcuR-uji5I5y2cXEij1YQwuB2NSWKTu4jcD-ZGj2zGLeFSUEcxUWezUQcdipBr24w4WtSYk87pfzL8dsD757w73u5SWEijnzTaEd_SR3u5O1VHXP761Zpeo7f35hzE1rXY_K97TqYqI5zkgRlu0_awSyBt4K0d_THxDE4gXm0TdWBnQAjY_aNNtHVcy2SOm6pySXtaVxiJCRM8Cyq_N1OTSQFKpEI89vTcNg_jYw48D4MA6exoy2T11c5P1PUnem1NAeyBjk8xspdN9Eq8pYdEpsnXHiQ-1mDRQKWKvBzYAjW6aFUNwCQP1WMIdRASeV_O5OKdZs1NevGiwCOwhL8WRptKV_dTDpt6fj25EPhSOg1he5d1e0O8M4vjmTZrX13JI7Ehg9EG1CiIi62GN1ngRfMyxmvYw9HpOvfuAATjaa5cw30iLLjcLgEkDZQAT5alDkVRxLxfudK5KLwh_kiNDTAR51xEC5yOcsxtmzk0cVt1g87yrfQKvVeGVdu6Zv_-mKnWqMz3Xs9GViFmfI6DjB1Onfq-c8M9C-6MhyRf88EBmwhEO2r8VNZR8ZPE9Fb0S34csEWAwU2Mz7NaeZ_OnYrshTZ8pxq7EFKdXhoeeLz6S7hbM_-hxQ_RBwyw_QnxaHyv04UTt7QW7_xshXY6QMjEhwhktRhIdKLSXz2q8ymVdcVhXbaQ

Activity

Note that CVE Details and the Exploit Database show a different number of exploits for the Cisco IOS.

Which one has the most?

Put your answer in the chat window

China highjacks 15% of Internet traffic

> For about 18 minutes on April 8, 2010, China Telecom advertised erroneous network traffic routes that instructed US and other foreign Internet traffic to travel through Chinese servers. Other servers around the world quickly adopted these paths, routing all traffic to about 15 percent of the Internet's destinations through servers located in China. This incident affected traffic to and from US government (".gov") and military (".mil") sites, including those for the Senate, the army, the navy, the marine corps, the air force, the office of secretary of Defense, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of Commerce, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and many others. Certain commercial websites were also affected, such as those for Dell, Yahoo!, Microsoft, and IBM.

- Huge man-in-the-middle attack
- BGP can be hijacked by one ISP router advertising fraudulent routes to other routers.
- Traffic get re-routed presumably for eavesdropping purposes

http://arstechnica.com/security/2010/11/how-china-swallowed-15-of-net-traffic-for-18-minutes/

BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) Attack

Rerouting Internet traffic by attacking BGP



A malicious router advertises fraudulent routes which are then picked up and spread by other routers

http://arstechnica.com/security/2010/11/how-china-swallowed-15-of-net-traffic-for-18-minutes/

Firewalls

Firewalls



- Controls incoming and outgoing traffic from a network.
- Hardware (Cisco, Palo Alto Networks) are fast and independent of other operating systems on the network.
- Software firewalls (netfilter, Windows firewall) are slower and depend on the OS where they are running).

Firewall Technologies



- Network Address Translation
- MAC address filtering
- IP and Port filtering
- Stateful packet inspection
- Application layer inspection

Network Address Translation



Configuring NAT to forward port 22 on the pfSense firewall

Wireless MAC filter



Wireless MAC filter on Asus router

IP Address and Port Filtering

Anatomy Of An Access List

List No.	Rule	Pattern Definition						
access-list xxx (100-199)	permit or deny	IP or ICMP TCP or UDP	Source IP address xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx	Source IP address mask xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx 255=ignore 0=apply	Destination IP address xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx	Destination IP address mask xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx 255=ignore 0=apply	eq=equal gt=greater than lt=less than neq=not equal	TCP or UDP destination port no.
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

1) Every extended access list has a number from 100 to 199, which identifies the list in two places. When building the list, every line must be labeled with the same access list number. When you apply the list to an interface on the router, you must reference it by the same number. Version 11.2 of the IOS allows you to use a name for the list instead of a number.

2) A permit or deny rule has to be applied to every line or statement on the list.

3) If you are only filtering on IP address, you will specify IP (or ICMP for pings and trace routes) as the protocol. This means that only the IP address is considered for a match. If you are also filtering on UDP or TCP port, you must specify TCP or UDP.

4) Every line in the list must have a source address.

Required Optional

5) Every IP source address in the list must have a mask. The mask lets you determine how much of the preceding IP address to apply to the filter. In most cases, you will simply want to put a 255 corresponding to every octet in the IP address that you want to ignore, and 0 for every octet that you want the packet match to apply to.

6) Every line in the list must have a destination address.

7) Every IP destination address in the list must have a mask. See 5 above.

8) This applies to the TCP or UDP port that you are filtering on. In most cases, you will use the eq, which means equals. This gives you the ability to permit or deny TCP or UDP ports equal to the port specified. There are cases, however, where you will want to apply a range of port numbers, which is where the gt, greater than, or lt, less than, will come in handy.

9) If you have defined the pattern as a TCP or UDP packet, you will have to have an associated port number.

https://www.scribd.com/document/269048661/Anatomy-of-an-Access-List

```
ip access-list extended FIREWALL-IN-20160604
 permit tcp any host 207.62.187.231 eq 22
 permit tcp any host 207.62.187.231 eq www
 permit tcp any host 207.62.187.231 eq 443
```

Access List on a Cisco Router

Stateful packet inspection

```
[root@p24-elrond ~]# cat /etc/sysconfig/iptables
# Generated by iptables-save v1.4.7 on Sun Mar 17 13:38:54 2013
*nat
:PREROUTING ACCEPT [274:29705]
:POSTROUTING ACCEPT [17:1421]
:OUTPUT ACCEPT [15:1301]
-A PREROUTING -d 172.20.192.171/32 -i eth0 -j DNAT --to-destination 192.168.24.9
-A POSTROUTING -s 192.168.24.9/32 -o eth0 -j SNAT --to-source 172.20.192.171
-A POSTROUTING -s 192.168.24.0/24 -o eth0 -j SNAT --to-source 172.20.192.170
COMMIT
# Completed on Sun Mar 17 13:38:54 2013
# Generated by iptables-save v1.4.7 on Sun Mar 17 13:38:54 2013
*filter
:INPUT DROP [10:985]
:FORWARD DROP [9:756]
:OUTPUT DROP [0:0]
-A INPUT -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -s 192.168.24.0/24 -d 192.168.24.1/32 -i eth1 -m state --state NEW -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables INPUT:" --log-level 6
-A FORWARD -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
-A FORWARD -s 192.168.24.0/24 -m state --state NEW -j ACCEPT
-A FORWARD -d 192.168.24.9/32 -p tcp -m state --state NEW -m tcp --dport 23 -j ACCEPT
-A FORWARD -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables FORWARD:" --log-level 6
-A OUTPUT -m state --state NEW,RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
COMMIT
# Completed on Sun Mar 17 13:38:54 2013
[root@p24-elrond ~]#
```


Netfilter (iptables) firewall on Linux server can use TCP connection states

Application layer inspection



Creating security policy on a Palo Alto Networks firewall

23	allow-some-to-sun-hwa	none	universal	CIS-187-zone	any	any	any	Server-425-zone	host-sun-hwa-ext .231	any	any

Application layer inspection

Name	Location	Count	Rule Name	Threat Name	Host Type	Severity	Action	Packet Capture
strict-cap		Rules: 10	simple-client-critical	any	client	critical	block	single-packet
			simple-client-high	any	client	high	block	single-packet
			simple-client-medium	any	client	medium	block	disable
			simple-client-informational	any	client	informational	default	disable
			simple-client-low	any	client	low	default	disable
			simple-server-critical	any	server	critical	block	single-packet
			simple-server-high	any	server	high	block	single-packet
			more...					

Application layer inspection

(addr.dst in 207.62.187.231)

Receive Time	Type	Name	From Zone	Attacker	Victim	To Port	Application	Action	Severity	Rule
12/04 13:42:28	vulnerability	Unknown HTTP Request Method Found	CIS-187-zone	50.247.81.99	207.62.187.231	80	web-browsing	alert	informational	allow-some-to-sun-hwa
12/04 13:42:25	vulnerability	HTTP OPTIONS Method	CIS-187-zone	50.247.81.99	207.62.187.231	80	web-browsing	alert	informational	allow-some-to-sun-hwa
12/04 13:17:05	vulnerability	Unknown HTTP Request Method Found	CIS-187-zone	50.247.81.99	207.62.187.231	80	web-browsing	alert	informational	allow-some-to-sun-hwa
12/04 13:17:04	vulnerability	HTTP OPTIONS Method	CIS-187-zone	50.247.81.99	207.62.187.231	80	web-browsing	alert	informational	allow-some-to-sun-hwa
12/03 19:07:49	vulnerability	SSH User Authentication Brute Force Attempt	CIS-187-zone	221.194.47.208	207.62.187.231	22	ssh	reset-both	high	allow-some-to-sun-hwa
12/03 19:07:48	vulnerability	SSH User Authentication Brute Force Attempt	CIS-187-zone	221.194.47.208	207.62.187.231	22	ssh	reset-both	high	allow-some-to-sun-hwa
12/03 19:07:48	vulnerability	SSH User Authentication Brute Force Attempt	CIS-187-zone	221.194.47.208	207.62.187.231	22	ssh	reset-both	high	allow-some-to-sun-hwa
12/03 19:07:47	vulnerability	SSH User Authentication Brute Force Attempt	CIS-187-zone	221.194.47.208	207.62.187.231	22	ssh	reset-both	high	allow-some-to-sun-hwa
12/03 14:10:45	vulnerability	Unknown HTTP Request Method Found	CIS-187-zone	71.80.249.170	207.62.187.231	80	web-browsing	alert	informational	allow-some-to-sun-hwa
12/03 14:10:45	vulnerability	HTTP OPTIONS Method	CIS-187-zone	71.80.249.170	207.62.187.231	80	web-browsing	alert	informational	allow-some-to-sun-hwa
12/03 14:10:32	vulnerability	HTTP OPTIONS Method	CIS-187-zone	71.80.249.170	207.62.187.231	80	web-browsing	alert	informational	allow-some-to-sun-hwa
12/03 12:16:40	vulnerability	Unknown HTTP Request Method Found	CIS-187-zone	198.8.80.82	207.62.187.231	80	web-browsing	alert	informational	allow-some-to-sun-hwa
12/03 12:16:38	vulnerability	HTTP OPTIONS Method	CIS-187-zone	198.8.80.82	207.62.187.231	80	web-browsing	alert	informational	allow-some-to-sun-hwa
12/03 11:49:31	vulnerability	Unknown HTTP Request Method Found	CIS-187-zone	198.8.80.82	207.62.187.231	80	web-browsing	alert	informational	allow-some-to-sun-hwa
12/03 11:49:31	vulnerability	HTTP OPTIONS Method	CIS-187-zone	198.8.80.82	207.62.187.231	80	web-browsing	alert	informational	allow-some-to-sun-hwa
12/03 08:13:31	vulnerability	OpenSSH AES-GCM Auth Remote Code Execution Vulnerability	CIS-187-zone	162.243.196.164	207.62.187.231	22	ssh	alert	low	allow-some-to-sun-hwa
12/03 08:13:31	vulnerability	OpenSSH AES-GCM Auth Remote Code Execution	CIS-187-zone	162.243.196.164	207.62.187.231	22	ssh	alert	low	allow-some-to-sun-hwa

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | Resolve hostname | Displaying logs 301 - 400 | 100 per page | DESC

The PAN firewall catches the brute force attack and resets the connection

Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems

Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)

- Software application or hardware device.
- Monitor traffic and alert administrators of potential attacks.
- Scan incoming packets for known exploit signatures, and any behavior or protocol anomalies.
- Host based (HIDS) include anti-virus, Tripwire and OSSEC.
- Network based (NIDS) include SNORT and Suricata.
- Passive IDS only monitors and reports.
- Active IDS will communicate with routers and firewalls to block specific attackers.

Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS)

- Like an active IDS except is an inline device with all traffic flowing through it.
- An IPS can automatically stop attacks.
- Palo Alto Networks firewalls can be used as an IDS or an IPS.

IDS Evasion

- Payload obfuscation
  - Encoding and encryption
  - Polymorphism
- Insertion and evasion
  - Fragmentation and small packets
  - Overlapping fragments and TCP segments
  - Protocol ambiguities
  - Low bandwidth attacks
- Denial of service
  - CPU exhaustion
  - Memory exhaustion
  - Operator fatigue

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intrusion_detection_system_evasion_techniques

Using Security Onion and a PA-500



https://securityonion.net/

Security Onion is installed on a VM using SNORT and observes traffic via a tap port.

It bundles Squert, Sguil, SNORT, ELSA, Bro and more.

The Palo Alto Networks PA-500 is inline and all traffic goes through it

https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/

nmap "all" scan

nmap -p 22,80,443 -A 207.62.187.231,243

```
root@pen-kali:~# nmap -p 22,80,443 -A 207.62.187.231,243

Starting Nmap 7.12 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2016-12-05 22:58 PST
Nmap scan report for 207.62.187.231
Host is up (0.00079s latency).
PORT    STATE  SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp  open   ssh     OpenSSH 7.2p2 Ubuntu 4ubuntu2.1 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2
.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|   2048 a8:d2:3e:8f:fd:86:d9:95:ca:81:8f:c6:d7:49:84:f1 (RSA)
|_  256 aa:2d:f1:b6:df:d9:2a:21:02:6b:52:f2:3f:58:19:e2 (ECDSA)
80/tcp  open   http    Apache httpd 2.4.18 ((Ubuntu))
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu)
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html).
443/tcp closed https
Device type: general purpose
Running: Linux 3.X|4.X
OS CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:3 cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:4
OS details: Linux 3.11 - 4.1
Network Distance: 3 hops
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel

TRACEROUTE (using port 443/tcp)
HOP RTT     ADDRESS
1   0.38 ms 10.99.99.1
2   0.45 ms 207.62.187.226
3   0.55 ms 207.62.187.231

Nmap scan report for 207.62.187.243
Host is up (0.00079s latency).
PORT    STATE    SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp  filtered ssh
80/tcp  open     http    Apache httpd 2.0.52 ((Red Hat))
| http-methods:
|_  Potentially risky methods: TRACE
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.0.52 (Red Hat)
|_http-title: Cisco Academy OnLine Curriculum
443/tcp filtered https
```

Caught in both Squert and PAN logs

Squert


squert (1890) - matahari - Chromium
ELSA
squert (1890) - mata
https://localhost/squert/index.php?id=69d83723933455457100ab8317c96370
EVENTS
SUMMARY
VIEWS
INTERVAL: 2016-12-06 00:00:00 -> 2016-12-06 23:59:59 (+00:00)
FILTERED BY OBJECT: NO
FILTERED BY SENSOR: NO
PRIORITY: 20.3% 71.1% 1.7% 6.9%
TOGGLE
queue only on
grouping on
SUMMARY
queued events 1890
total events 1890
total signatures 14
total sources -
total destinations -
COUNT BY PRIORITY
high 384 (20.3%)
medium 1343 (71.1%)
low 32 (1.7%)
other 131 (6.9%)
COUNT BY CLASSIFICATION
compromised L1 -
compromised L2 -
attempted access -
denial of service -
policy violation -
reconnaissance -
malicious -
QUEUE SC DC ACTIVITY LAST EVENT SIGNATURE ID PROTO % TOTAL
16 1 1 06:59:27 ET SCAN Potential SSH Scan OUTBOUND 2003068 6 0.847%
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET 22 (msg:"ET SCAN Potential SSH Scan OUTBOUND"; flags:S,12; threshold: type threshold, track by_src, count 5, seconds 120; reference:url,en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brute_force_attack; reference:url,doc.emergingthreats.net/2003068; classtype:attempted-recon; sid:2003068; rev:6;)
file: downloaded.rules:10641
CATEGORIZE 0 EVENT(S)
CREATE FILTER: src dst both
QUEUE ACTIVITY LAST EVENT SOURCE COUNTRY DESTINATION COUNTRY
16 2016-12-06 06:59:27 10.99.99.100 RFC1918 (.lo) 207.62.187.231 UNITED STATES (.us)
ST TIMESTAMP EVENT ID SOURCE PORT DESTINATION PORT SIGNATURE
RT 2016-12-06 06:59:27 4.61775 10.99.99.100 44738 207.62.187.231 22 ET SCAN Potential SSH Scan OUTBOUND
RT 2016-12-06 06:59:26 5.67462 10.99.99.100 44712 207.62.187.231 22 ET SCAN Potential SSH Scan OUTBOUND
RT 2016-12-06 06:59:26 4.61774 10.99.99.100 44696 207.62.187.231 22 ET SCAN Potential SSH Scan OUTBOUND
RT 2016-12-06 06:59:11 5.67461 10.99.99.100 46512 207.62.187.231 22 ET SCAN Potential SSH Scan OUTBOUND
RT 2016-12-06 06:59:11 3.371244 10.99.99.100 46513 207.62.187.231 22 ET SCAN Potential SSH Scan OUTBOUND
RT 2016-12-06 06:17:49 3.371231 10.99.99.100 55006 207.62.187.231 22 ET SCAN Potential SSH Scan OUTBOUND
RT 2016-12-06 06:17:48 4.61760 10.99.99.100 54968 207.62.187.231 22 ET SCAN Potential SSH Scan OUTBOUND
RT 2016-12-06 06:17:48 3.371230 10.99.99.100 54964 207.62.187.231 22 ET SCAN Potential SSH Scan OUTBOUND
WELCOME matahari | LOGOUT
UTC 07:02:41

PAN


paloalto NETWORKS
Dashboard
ACC
Monitor
Policies
Objects
Network
Device
Commit
(1)
Save
Manual
Help
Logs
Traffic
Threat
URL Filtering
WildFire Submissions
Data Filtering
HIP Match
Configuration
System
Alarms
Packet Capture
App Scope
Summary
Change Monitor
Threat Monitor
Threat Map
Network Monitor
Traffic Map
Session Browser
Botnet
PDF Reports
Manage PDF Summary
User Activity Report
Report Groups
Email Scheduler
Manage Custom Reports
Reports
(addr in 10.99.99.100)
Receive Time | Type | Name | From Zone | Attacker | Victim | To Port | Application | Action | Severity | Rule
12/05 22:59:30 | vulnerability | Unknown HTTP Request Method Found | CIS-187-zone | 10.99.99.100 | 207.62.187.243 | 80 | web-browsing | alert | informational | allow-some-to-valiente
12/05 22:59:30 | vulnerability | Unknown HTTP Request Method Found | CIS-187-zone | 10.99.99.100 | 207.62.187.231 | 80 | web-browsing | alert | informational | allow-some-to-sun-hwa
12/05 22:59:30 | vulnerability | HTTP OPTIONS Method | CIS-187-zone | 10.99.99.100 | 207.62.187.243 | 80 | web-browsing | alert | informational | allow-some-to-valiente
12/05 22:59:30 | vulnerability | HTTP OPTIONS Method | CIS-187-zone | 10.99.99.100 | 207.62.187.231 | 80 | web-browsing | alert | informational | allow-some-to-sun-hwa
12/05 22:46:36 | vulnerability | Bash Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | CIS-187-zone | 10.99.99.100 | 207.62.187.231 | 80 | web-browsing | reset-both | critical | allow-some-to-sun-hwa
12/05 22:17:53 | vulnerability | Unknown HTTP Request Method Found | CIS-187-zone | 10.99.99.100 | 207.62.187.231 | 80 | web-browsing | alert | informational | allow-some-to-sun-hwa
12/05 22:17:53 | vulnerability | HTTP OPTIONS Method | CIS-187-zone | 10.99.99.100 | 207.62.187.231 | 80 | web-browsing | alert | informational | allow-some-to-sun-hwa
12/05 22:15:32 | vulnerability | Unknown HTTP Request Method Found | CIS-187-zone | 10.99.99.100 | 207.62.187.243 | 80 | web-browsing | alert | informational | allow-some-to-valiente
12/05 22:15:32 | vulnerability | HTTP OPTIONS Method | CIS-187-zone | 10.99.99.100 | 207.62.187.243 | 80 | web-browsing | alert | informational | allow-some-to-valiente
12/05 22:10:35 | vulnerability | Unknown HTTP Request Method Found | CIS-187-zone | 10.99.99.100 | 207.62.187.243 | 80 | web-browsing | alert | informational | allow-some-to-valiente
12/05 22:10:35 | vulnerability | HTTP OPTIONS Method | CIS-187-zone | 10.99.99.100 | 207.62.187.243 | 80 | web-browsing | alert | informational | allow-some-to-valiente
12/05 22:07:21 | vulnerability | Unknown HTTP Request Method Found | CIS-187-zone | 10.99.99.100 | 207.62.187.231 | 80 | web-browsing | alert | informational | allow-some-to-sun-hwa
12/05 22:07:21 | vulnerability | HTTP OPTIONS Method | CIS-187-zone | 10.99.99.100 | 207.62.187.231 | 80 | web-browsing | alert | informational | allow-some-to-sun-hwa
07/12 15:27:11 | vulnerability | Bash Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | CIS-187-zone | 10.99.99.100 | 207.62.187.243 | 80 | web-browsing | reset-both | critical | allow-some-to-valiente
07/12 15:27:10 | vulnerability | Bash Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | CIS-187-zone | 10.99.99.100 | 207.62.187.243 | 80 | web-browsing | reset-both | critical | allow-some-to-valiente
07/12 15:27:10 | vulnerability | Bash Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | CIS-187-zone | 10.99.99.100 | 207.62.187.243 | 80 | web-browsing | reset-both | critical | allow-some-to-valiente
07/12 15:27:10 | vulnerability | Bash Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | CIS-187-zone | 10.99.99.100 | 207.62.187.243 | 80 | web-browsing | reset-both | critical | allow-some-to-valiente
1
Resolve hostname
Displaying logs 1 - 97
100
per page
DESC

nmap "shellshock" scan



Squert doesn't log anything, but PAN logs it and resets the connection

PAN



PAN logs it and resets the conection

PAN



One packet captured

PAN



One packet captured and exported to Wireshark

nmap "heartbleed" scan

nmap -p 443 --script ssl-heartbleed opus.cis.cabrillo.edu



Squert, Sguil and PAN log it

Squert



Squert logs the self-signed certificate sent to attacker

Sguil



Sguil logs the self-signed certificate sent to attacker

PAN

PAN logs it and resets the connection

Honeypots

Honeypots

- Decoy servers to lure and trap hackers.
- Configured with vulnerabilities and fake but enticing data.
- Attempts to keep hackers engaged long enough that they can be traced back.
- Allows security professionals to observe how hackers operate and the tools they use.
- Commercial and open source honeypots are available.

Testing an IDS

ETHICAL HACKING
LAB SERIES

Lab 16: Evading IDS

Material in this Lab Aligns to the Following Certification Domains/Objectives
Certified Ethical Hacking (CEH) Domain
16: Evading IDS, Firewalls and Honeypots

Document Version: 2016-03-09

Test IDS Results with Fragmented Scan

nmap -f 192.168.0.2



This does a fragmented scan


Host: Security Onion, Pod: NDG_EH_POD 4 :: NETLAB+ Remote PC Viewer
Viewer View PC Settings Help
SGUIL-0.9.0 - Connected To ...
Snorby - Dashboard - Chromium
Tue, 06 Dec 16:32
ndg
squert (17) - ndg
Snorby - Dashboard
https://localhost:444/dashboard
Snorby
SPONSORED BY threat stack
Welcome Administrator | Settings | Log out
Dashboard
My Queue (0)
Events
Sensors
Search
Administration
Dashboard
More Options
LAST 24 TODAY YESTERDAY THIS WEEK THIS MONTH THIS QUARTER THIS YEAR
Updated: 12/06/16 04:27 PM UTC
0
HIGH SEVERITY
16
MEDIUM SEVERITY
0
LOW SEVERITY
Sensors
Severities
Protocols
Signatures
Sources
Destinations
Event Count vs Time By Sensor
ndg-virtual-machine-eth0:1
ndg-virtual-machine:NULL
Event Count
TOP 5 SENSOR
ndg-virtual-machine-eth0:1 304
ndg-virtual-machine:NULL 0
TOP 5 ACTIVE USERS
Administrator 0
LAST 5 UNIQUE EVENTS
ET POLICY Suspicious inbo... 29
ET POLICY Suspicious inbo... 29
ET POLICY Suspicious inbo... 32
ET POLICY Suspicious inbo... 30
ET SCAN Potential VNC Sca... 25
ANALYST CLASSIFIED EVENTS
Unauthorized Root Access 0
Unauthorized User Access 0
Attempted Unauthorized... 0
Denial of Service Attack 0
Policy Violation 0


Host: Security Onion, Pod: NDG_EH_POD 4 :: NETLAB+ Remote PC Viewer
Viewer View PC Settings Help
SGUIL-0.9.0 - Connected To ...
Snorby - Medium Severity E...
Tue, 06 Dec 16:37
ndg
Snorby - Medium Severity Events - Chromium
squert (17) - ndg
Snorby - Medium Sever
https://localhost:444/results?match_all=true&search%5Betime%5D%5Bcolumn%5D=
Snorby
threat stack
Welcome Administrator | Settings | Log out
Dashboard
My Queue (0)
Events
Sensors
Search
Administration
Medium Severity Events 16 events found
Hotkeys
Classify Event(s)
More Options
Sev. Sensor Source IP Destination IP Event Signature Timestamp
2 ndg-virtual- 192.168.9.2 192.168.0.2 ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to Oracle SQL port 1521 4:25 PM
2 ndg-virtual- 192.168.9.2 192.168.0.2 ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to PostgreSQL port 5432 4:25 PM
2 ndg-virtual- 192.168.9.2 192.168.0.2 ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to MSSQL port 1433 4:25 PM
2 ndg-virtual- 192.168.9.2 192.168.0.2 ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to mySQL port 3306 4:25 PM
2 ndg-virtual- 192.168.9.2 192.168.0.2 ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to Oracle SQL port 1521 4:25 PM
2 ndg-virtual- 192.168.9.2 192.168.0.2 ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to PostgreSQL port 5432 4:25 PM
2 ndg-virtual- 192.168.9.2 192.168.0.2 ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to MSSQL port 1433 4:25 PM
2 ndg-virtual- 192.168.9.2 192.168.0.2 ET SCAN Potential VNC Scan 5900-5920 4:25 PM
2 ndg-virtual- 192.168.9.2 192.168.0.2 ET SCAN Potential VNC Scan 5800-5820 4:25 PM
2 ndg-virtual- 192.168.9.2 192.168.0.2 ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to mySQL port 3306 4:25 PM
2 ndg-virtual- 192.168.9.2 192.168.0.2 ET SCAN Potential VNC Scan 5800-5820 4:18 PM
2 ndg-virtual- 192.168.9.2 192.168.0.2 ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to PostgreSQL port 5432 4:18 PM
2 ndg-virtual- 192.168.9.2 192.168.0.2 ET SCAN Potential VNC Scan 5900-5920 4:18 PM
2 ndg-virtual- 192.168.9.2 192.168.0.2 ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to Oracle SQL port 1521 4:18 PM
2 ndg-virtual- 192.168.9.2 192.168.0.2 ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to MSSQL port 1433 4:18 PM
2 ndg-virtual- 192.168.9.2 192.168.0.2 ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to mySQL port 3306 4:18 PM

	Sev.	Sensor	Source IP	Destination IP	Event Signature	Timestamp
	2	ndg-virtual-	192.168.9.2	192.168.0.2	ET POLICY Suspicious Inbound to Oracle SQL port 1521	4:25 PM
	2	ndg-virtual-	192.168.9.2	192.168.0.2	ET POLICY Suspicious Inbound to PostgreSQL port 5432	4:25 PM
	2	ndg-virtual-	192.168.9.2	192.168.0.2	ET POLICY Suspicious Inbound to MSSQL port 1433	4:25 PM
	2	ndg-virtual-	192.168.9.2	192.168.0.2	ET POLICY Suspicious Inbound to mySQL port 3306	4:25 PM
	2	ndg-virtual-	192.168.9.2	192.168.0.2	ET POLICY Suspicious Inbound to Oracle SQL port 1521	4:25 PM
	2	ndg-virtual-	192.168.9.2	192.168.0.2	ET POLICY Suspicious Inbound to PostgreSQL port 5432	4:25 PM
	2	ndg-virtual-	192.168.9.2	192.168.0.2	ET POLICY Suspicious Inbound to MSSQL port 1433	4:25 PM
	2	ndg-virtual-	192.168.9.2	192.168.0.2	ET SCAN Potential VNC Scan 5900-5920	4:25 PM
	2	ndg-virtual-	192.168.9.2	192.168.0.2	ET SCAN Potential VNC Scan 5800-5820	4:25 PM
	2	ndg-virtual-	192.168.9.2	192.168.0.2	ET POLICY Suspicious Inbound to mySQL port 3306	4:25 PM


Host: Security Onion, Pod: NDG_EH_POD 4 :: NETLAB+ Remote PC Viewer
Viewer View PC Settings Help
SGUIL-0.9.0 - Connected To ...
squert (17) - ndg - Chromium
Tue, 06 Dec 16:33
ndg
squert (17) - ndg - Chromium
squert (17) - ndg
Snorby - Dashboard
https://localhost/squert/index.php?id=110d78bfe8d79c7f84abaea0f936cae5
EVENTS SUMMARY VIEWS
INTERVAL: 2016-12-06 00:00:00 -> 2016-12-06 23:59:59 (+00:00) FILTERED BY OBJECT: NO FILTERED BY SENSOR: NO PRIORITY:
TOGGLE
queue only on
grouping on
SUMMARY
queued events 17
total events 17
total signatures 7
total sources -
total destinations -
COUNT BY PRIORITY
high -
medium 16 (94.1%)
low -
other 1 (5.9%)
COUNT BY CLASSIFICATION
compromised L1 -
compromised L2 -
attempted access -
denial of service -
policy violation -
reconnaissance -
malicious -
no action req'd. -
escalated event -
QUEUE SC DC ACTIVITY LAST EVENT SIGNATURE ID PROTO % TOTAL
3 1 1 16:25:17 ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to MSSQL port 1433 2010935 6 17.647%
3 1 1 16:25:17 ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to Oracle SQL port 1521 2010936 6 17.647%
3 1 1 16:25:17 ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to mySQL port 3306 2010937 6 17.647%
3 1 1 16:25:17 ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to PostgreSQL port 5432 2010939 6 17.647%
2 1 1 16:25:09 ET SCAN Potential VNC Scan 5800-5820 2002910 6 11.765%
2 1 1 16:25:09 ET SCAN Potential VNC Scan 5900-5920 2002911 6 11.765%
1 7 1 1 16:18:06 [OSSEC] Integrity checksum changed. 550 0 5.882%
WELCOME ndg | LOGOUT
UTC 16:33:04

QUEUE	SC	DC	ACTIVITY	LAST EVENT	SIGNATURE	ID	PROTO	% TOTAL
3	1	1		16:25:17	ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to MSSQL port 1433	2010935	6	17.647%
3	1	1		16:25:17	ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to Oracle SQL port 1521	2010936	6	17.647%
3	1	1		16:25:17	ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to mySQL port 3306	2010937	6	17.647%
3	1	1		16:25:17	ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to PostgreSQL port 5432	2010939	6	17.647%
2	1	1		16:25:09	ET SCAN Potential VNC Scan 5800-5820	2002910	6	11.765%
2	1	1		16:25:09	ET SCAN Potential VNC Scan 5900-5920	2002911	6	11.765%
1 7	1	1		16:18:06	[OSSEC] Integrity checksum changed.	550	0	5.882%


Host: Security Onion, Pod: NDG_EH_POD 4 :: NETLAB+ Remote PC Viewer
Viewer View PC Settings Help
SGUIL-0.9.0 - Connected To ...
[squert (17) - ndg - Chromiu...
Tue, 06 Dec 16:36
ndg
SGUIL-0.9.0 - Connected To localhost
File Query Reports Sound: Off ServerName: localhost UserName: ndg UserID: 2
2016-12-06 16:36:12 GMT
RealTime Events
Escalated Events
ST ...T S... A... Date/Time Src IP SPort Dst IP DPort Pr Event Message
RT 11 n... 3... 2015-12-21 16:27:08 192.168.9.2 44229 192.168.0.2 5432 6 ET POLICY Suspicious ...
RT 13 n... 3... 2015-12-21 16:27:08 192.168.9.2 44229 192.168.0.2 3306 6 ET POLICY Suspicious ...
RT 1 n... 4... 2015-12-21 16:27:09 192.168.9.2 54663 192.168.0.2 80 6 PADS Changed Asset -...
RT 1 n... 3... 2015-12-26 19:39:06 204.85.32.89 80 192.168.0.2 54907 6 GPL SHELLCODE x86 s...
RT 2 n... 4... 2015-12-27 22:01:24 192.168.0.2 59433 192.168.9.2 80 6 PADS Changed Asset -...
RT 1 n... 3... 2015-12-30 18:21:19 192.168.9.20 63653 192.168.0.2 5910 6 ET SCAN Potential VN...
RT 1 n... 3... 2015-12-30 18:21:19 192.168.9.20 63653 192.168.0.2 5800 6 ET SCAN Potential VN...
RT 1 n... 3... 2015-12-30 18:21:19 192.168.9.20 63653 192.168.0.2 1521 6 ET POLICY Suspicious ...
RT 1 n... 3... 2015-12-30 18:21:19 192.168.9.20 63653 192.168.0.2 3306 6 ET POLICY Suspicious ...
IP Resolution
Agent Status
Snort Statistics
Reverse DNS
Enable External DNS
Src IP:
Src Name:
Dst IP:
Dst Name:
Whois Query: None Src IP Dst IP
Show Packet Data
Show Rule
IP
Source IP Dest IP Ver HL TOS len ID flag
192.168.9.20 192.168.0.2 4 5 0 44 45128 0
TCP
Source Port Dest Port R R R C S S Y I U A P R S F 1 0 G K H T N N Seq # Ack # Offset Res
63653 3306 X 2139733573 0 6 0
DATA
Search Packet Payload
Hex
Text
NoCa

Test IDS Results with Low MTU Scan

nmap --mtu 8 192.168.0.2



This does a fragmented scan by limiting the MTU (maximum transmission unit)



Snorby did catch last scan



Snorby did catch last scan



Squert did catch last scan



Sguil did NOT catch last scan

Test IDS Results with Decoy Scan

nmap -D 192.168.0.20 192.168.0.30 192.168.0.40 192.168.0.2



Cloaked scan using decoy source addresses



Squert caught the decoy addresses


Host: Security Onion, Pod: NDG_EH_POD 4 :: NETLAB+ Remote PC Viewer
Viewer View PC Settings Help
SGUIL-0.9.0 - Connected To ...
Snorby - Dashboard - Chro...
Tue, 06 Dec 17:09
ndg
Snorby - Dashboard - Chromium
squert (36) - ndg
Snorby - Dashboard
https://localhost:444/dashboard
Snorby
SPONSORED BY threat stack
Welcome Administrator | Settings | Log out
Dashboard
My Queue (0)
Events
Sensors
Search
Administration
Dashboard
More Options
LAST 24 TODAY YESTERDAY THIS WEEK THIS MONTH THIS QUARTER THIS YEAR
0
HIGH SEVERITY
34
MEDIUM SEVERITY
0
LOW SEVERITY
Sensors
Severities
Protocols
Signatures
Sources
Destinations
Event Count vs Time By Sensor
ndg-virtual-machine-eth0:1
ndg-virtual-machine:NULL
Event Count
TOP 5 SENSOR
ndg-virtual-machine-eth0:1 322
ndg-virtual-machine:NULL 0
TOP 5 ACTIVE USERS
Administrator 0
LAST 5 UNIQUE EVENTS
ET SCAN Potential VNC Sca... 28
ET SCAN Potential VNC Sca... 30
ET POLICY Suspicious inbo... 32
ET POLICY Suspicious inbo... 32
ET POLICY Suspicious inbo... 35
ANALYST CLASSIFIED EVENTS
Unauthorized Root Access 0
Unauthorized User Access 0
Attempted Unauthorized... 0
Denial of Service Attack 0
Policy Violation 0
Resolving host...



Snorby caught the decoy addresses



Sguil only sees the decoy addresses

Test IDS Results with Spoofed MAC Scan

nmap -sT -PN -spoof-mac 0 192.168.0.2



Scanning with spoofed MAC address


Host: Security Onion, Pod: NDG_EH_POD 4 :: NETLAB+ Remote PC Viewer
Viewer View PC Settings Help
SGUIL-0.9.0 - Connected To ...
Snorby - Dashboard - Chro...
Tue, 06 Dec 17:22
ndg
Snorby - Dashboard - Chromium
squert (42) - ndg
Snorby - Dashboard
https://localhost:444/dashboard
Snorby
SPONSORED BY threat stack
Welcome Administrator | Settings | Log out
Dashboard
My Queue (0)
Events
Sensors
Search
Administration
Dashboard
More Options
LAST 24 TODAY YESTERDAY THIS WEEK THIS MONTH THIS QUARTER THIS YEAR
0
HIGH SEVERITY
40
MEDIUM SEVERITY
0
LOW SEVERITY
Sensors
Severities
Protocols
Signatures
Sources
Destinations
Event Count vs Time By Sensor
ndg-virtual-machine-eth0:1
ndg-virtual-machine:NULL
Event Count
TOP 5 SENSOR
ndg-virtual-machine-eth0:1 328
ndg-virtual-machine:NULL 0
TOP 5 ACTIVE USERS
Administrator 0
LAST 5 UNIQUE EVENTS
ET POLICY Suspicious inbo... 34
ET SCAN Potential VNC Sca... 29
ET SCAN Potential VNC Sca... 31
ET POLICY Suspicious inbo... 33
ET POLICY Suspicious inbo... 33
ANALYST CLASSIFIED EVENTS
Unauthorized Root Access 0
Unauthorized User Access 0
Attempted Unauthorized... 0
Denial of Service Attack 0
Policy Violation 0
Resolving host...


Host: Security Onion, Pod: NDG_EH_POD 4 :: NETLAB+ Remote PC Viewer
Viewer View PC Settings Help
SGUIL-0.9.0 - Connected To ...
Snorby - Medium Severity E
Tue 06 Dec 17:23
ndg
Snorby - Medium Severity Events - Chromium
squert (42) - ndg
Snorby - Medium Sever
https://localhost:444/results?match_all=true&search%5Betime%5D%5Bcolumn%5D=
Snorby
SPONSORED BY threat stack
Welcome Administrator | Settings | Log out
Dashboard
My Queue (0)
Events
Sensors
Search
Administration
Medium Severity Events 40 events found
Hotkeys
Classify Event(s)
More Options
Sev. Sensor Source IP Destination IP Event Signature Timestamp
2 ndg-virtual- 192.168.9.2 192.168.0.2 ET SCAN Potential VNC Scan 5800-5820 5:15 PM
2 ndg-virtual- 192.168.9.2 192.168.0.2 ET SCAN Potential VNC Scan 5900-5920 5:15 PM
2 ndg-virtual- 192.168.9.2 192.168.0.2 ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to PostgreSQL port 5432 5:15 PM
2 ndg-virtual- 192.168.9.2 192.168.0.2 ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to MSSQL port 1433 5:15 PM
2 ndg-virtual- 192.168.9.2 192.168.0.2 ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to Oracle SQL port 1521 5:15 PM
2 ndg-virtual- 192.168.9.2 192.168.0.2 ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to mySQL port 3306 5:15 PM
2 ndg-virtual- 192.168.9.2 192.168.0.2 ET SCAN Potential VNC Scan 5800-5820 5:06 PM
2 ndg-virtual- 192.168.9.20 192.168.0.2 ET SCAN Potential VNC Scan 5800-5820 5:06 PM
2 ndg-virtual- 192.168.9.2 192.168.0.2 ET SCAN Potential VNC Scan 5900-5920 5:06 PM
2 ndg-virtual- 192.168.9.20 192.168.0.2 ET SCAN Potential VNC Scan 5900-5920 5:06 PM
2 ndg-virtual- 192.168.9.2 192.168.0.2 ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to PostgreSQL port 5432 5:06 PM
2 ndg-virtual- 192.168.9.20 192.168.0.2 ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to PostgreSQL port 5432 5:06 PM
2 ndg-virtual- 192.168.9.2 192.168.0.2 ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to MSSQL port 1433 5:06 PM
2 ndg-virtual- 192.168.9.20 192.168.0.2 ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to MSSQL port 1433 5:06 PM
2 ndg-virtual- 192.168.9.2 192.168.0.2 ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to Oracle SQL port 1521 5:06 PM
2 ndg-virtual- 192.168.9.20 192.168.0.2 ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to Oracle SQL port 1521 5:06 PM
2 ndg-virtual- 192.168.9.2 192.168.0.2 ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to mySQL port 3306 5:06 PM


Host: Security Onion, Pod: NDG_EH_POD 4 :: NETLAB+ Remote PC Viewer
Viewer View PC Settings Help
SGUIL-0.9.0 - Connected To ...
squert (42) - ndg - Chromium
Tue, 06 Dec 17:24
ndg
squert (42) - ndg
Snorby - Medium Sever
https://localhost/squert/index.php?id=110d78bfe8d79c7f84abaea0f936cae5
EVENTS
SUMMARY
VIEWS
INTERVAL: 2016-12-06 00:00:00 -> 2016-12-06 23:59:59 (+00:00)
FILTERED BY OBJECT: NO
FILTERED BY SENSOR: NO
PRIORITY:
95.2%
4.8%
TOGGLE
queue only on
grouping on
SUMMARY
queued events 42
total events 42
total signatures 8
total sources -
total destinations -
COUNT BY PRIORITY
high -
medium 40 (95.2%)
low -
other 2 (4.8%)
COUNT BY CLASSIFICATION
compromised L1 -
compromised L2 -
attempted access -
denial of service -
policy violation -
reconnaissance -
malicious -
no action req'd. -
escalated event -
QUEUE SC DC ACTIVITY LAST EVENT SIGNATURE ID PROTO % TOTAL
6 2 1 17:15:04 ET SCAN Potential VNC Scan 5800-5820 2002910 6 14.286%
6 2 1 17:15:04 ET SCAN Potential VNC Scan 5900-5920 2002911 6 14.286%
7 2 1 17:15:04 ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to MSSQL port 1433 2010935 6 16.667%
7 2 1 17:15:04 ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to Oracle SQL port 1521 2010936 6 16.667%
7 2 1 17:15:04 ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to mySQL port 3306 2010937 6 16.667%
7 2 1 17:15:04 ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to PostgreSQL port 5432 2010939 6 16.667%
1 7 1 1 16:59:57 [OSSEC] Received 0 packets in designated time interval (defined in ossec.conf). Please check interface, cabling, and tap/span! 111112 0 2.381%
1 7 1 1 16:18:06 [OSSEC] Integrity checksum changed. 550 0 2.381%
WELCOME ndg | LOGOUT
UTC 17:24:24


Host: Security Onion, Pod: NDG_EH_POD 4 :: NETLAB+ Remote PC Viewer
Viewer View PC Settings Help
SGUIL-0.9.0 - Connected To ...
squert (42) - ndg - Chromium
Tue, 06 Dec 17:25
ndg
squert (42) - ndg - Chromium
squert (42) - ndg
Snorby - Medium Sever
https://localhost/squert/index.php?id=110d78bfe8d79c7f84abaea0f936cae5
EVENTS
SUMMARY
VIEWS
INTERVAL: 2016-12-06 00:00:00 -> 2016-12-06 23:59:59 (+00:00)
FILTERED BY OBJECT: NO
FILTERED BY SENSOR: NO
PRIORITY:
TOGGLE
queue only
grouping
SUMMARY
queued events 42
total events 42
total signatures 8
total sources -
total destinations -
COUNT BY PRIORITY
high -
medium 40 (95.2%)
low -
other 2 (4.8%)
COUNT BY CLASSIFICATION
compromised L1 -
compromised L2 -
attempted access -
denial of service -
policy violation -
reconnaissance -
malicious -
no action req'd. -
escalated event -
QUEUE SC DC ACTIVITY LAST EVENT SIGNATURE ID PROTO % TOTAL
6 2 1 17:15:04 ET SCAN Potential VNC Scan 5800-5820 2002910 6 14.286%
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 5800:5820 (msg:"ET SCAN Potential VNC Scan 5800-5820"; flags:S,12; threshold: type both, track by_src, count 5, seconds 60; reference:url,doc.emergingthreats.net/2002910; classtype:attempted-recon; sid:2002910; rev:5;)
file: downloaded.rules:9159
CATEGORIZE 0 EVENT(S)
CREATE FILTER: src dst both
QUEUE ACTIVITY LAST EVENT SOURCE COUNTRY DESTINATION COUNTRY
5 2016-12-06 17:15:04 192.168.9.2 RFC1918 (.lo) 192.168.0.2 RFC1918 (.lo)
ST TIMESTAMP EVENT ID SOURCE PORT DESTINATION PORT SIGNATURE
RT 2016-12-06 17:15:04 3.326 192.168.9.2 37597 192.168.0.2 5811 ET SCAN Potential VNC Scan 5800-5820
RT 2016-12-06 17:06:29 3.321 192.168.9.2 62625 192.168.0.2 5810 ET SCAN Potential VNC Scan 5800-5820
RT 2016-12-06 16:40:00 3.309 192.168.9.2 58161 192.168.0.2 5800 ET SCAN Potential VNC Scan 5800-5820
RT 2016-12-06 16:25:09 3.296 192.168.9.2 55464 192.168.0.2 5802 ET SCAN Potential VNC Scan 5800-5820
RT 2016-12-06 16:18:00 3.294 192.168.9.2 48079 192.168.0.2 5801 ET SCAN Potential VNC Scan 5800-5820
ET SCAN Potential VNC Scan 5900-5920
ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to MSSQL port 1433
ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to Oracle SQL port 1521
ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to mySQL port 3306
ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to PostgreSQL port 5432
[OSSEC] Received 0 packets in designated time interval (defined in ossec.conf). Please check interface, cabling, and tap/span!
WELCOME ndg | LOGOUT
UTC 17:25:05


Host: Security Onion, Pod: NDG_EH_POD 4 :: NETLAB+ Remote PC Viewer
Viewer View PC Settings Help
SGUIL-0.9.0 - Connected To ...
squert (42) - ndg - Chromium
Tue, 06 Dec 17:26
ndg
SGUIL-0.9.0 - Connected To localhost
File Query Reports Sound: Off ServerName: localhost UserName: ndg UserID: 2
2016-12-06 17:26:11 GMT
RealTime Events
Escalated Events
ST CNT Sensor Alert ID Date/Time Src IP SPort Dst IP DPort
RT 1 ndg-virtu... 4.61 2015-12-21 16:27:09 192.168.9.2 54663 192.168.0.2 80
RT 1 ndg-virtu... 3.246 2015-12-26 19:39:06 204.85.32.89 80 192.168.0.2 54907
RT 2 ndg-virtu... 4.74 2015-12-27 22:01:24 192.168.0.2 59433 192.168.9.2 80
RT 2 ndg-virtu... 3.278 2015-12-30 18:21:19 192.168.9.20 63653 192.168.0.2 5910
RT 2 ndg-virtu... 3.276 2015-12-30 18:21:19 192.168.9.20 63653 192.168.0.2 5800
RT 2 ndg-virtu... 3.274 2015-12-30 18:21:19 192.168.9.20 63653 192.168.0.2 1521
RT 2 ndg-virtu... 3.272 2015-12-30 18:21:19 192.168.9.20 63653 192.168.0.2 3306
RT 1 ndg-virtu... 3.316 2016-12-06 17:06:29 192.168.9.20 62625 192.168.0.2 1433
RT 1 ndg-virtu... 3.320 2016-12-06 17:06:29 192.168.9.20 62625 192.168.0.2 5432
IP Resolution
Agent Status
Snort Statistics
Reverse DNS
Enable External DNS
Src IP:
Src Name:
Dst IP:
Dst Name:
Whois Query: None Src IP Dst IP
Show Packet Data
Show Rule
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 5432 (msg:"ET POLICY
IP
Source IP
Dest IP
Ver HL TOS len ID
192.168.9.20
192.168.0.2
4 5 0 44 45870 0
TCP
Source Port
Dest Port
U A P R S F
R R R C S S Y I
1 0 G K H T N N
Seq #
Ack #
Offset Res
62625 5432 . . . . . X . 1436802972 0 6 0
DATA
None .
Search Packet Payload
Hex
Text
NoCa

Final Project Presentations

CIS 76 Project

Calendar Page

Assignment

- Project
- Test matrix
- Student projects

https://simms-teach.com/cis76calendar.php

Use this directory to share your project with other classmates for testing



https://cabrillo.instructure.com/courses/4167/pages/cis-76-project-folder


Assignment

Practice Test



The practice test is on Canvas


Wrap up

Next Class is the Final Exam (Test #3)

Thursday 4:00 PM

Test #3
Five Posts
Lab X1 (extra credit)
Lab X2 (extra credit)
Lab X3 (extra credit)
Lab X4 (extra credit)

Backup